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Once when "Care" was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she
thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she
was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by.
"Care" asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted.
But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he
forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead.
While "Care" and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and
desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since
she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn
to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which
seemed ajust one: "Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit,
you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth,
have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since
'Care' first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as
it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to
its name, let it be called 'homo', for it is made out of humus
(earth)."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Delaware Supreme Court has held 2-to the continuing detriment
of corporate law3 - that under certain conditions it will review duty of care
'MARTINHEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 242 (John Macquarie & Edward Robinson trans.,
Harper & Row 1962) (1927) (quoting No. 220 of the Fables of Hyginus).
2Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). The
litigation resulting from the sale of Technicolor, Inc. has produced many reported opinions, in
addition to those cited above. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS
196, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1998); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch.
1994), affld, Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1991), reprinted
in, 17 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 551 (1991), rev'd inpart, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345
(Del. 1993); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129,1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 19, 1990), revd, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). Where it is unnecessary in this article to refer to
a specifiejudicial opinion in the above litigation, reference will simply be made to "Cede." For ease
ofreference, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), will be referred to as Cede
1; Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995), will be referred to as Cede M11.
3The Delaware Supreme Court continues to adhere to the holdings in the Cede litigation.
See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Del. 1999). Delaware corporate law
decisions not only affect Delaware corporations but are frequently used by other state courts for
guidance. See, e.g., I-ilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (D. Nev. 1997)
(applying Delaware law as persuasive authority where Nevada law is silent on the issue). A
California courtrelied upon the Cede 11holding forthe grossly overgeneralized proposition that "in
Delaware, analysis of a breach of fiduciary duty claim involves application of the 'entire fairness
test."' Interactive MultimediaArtists, Inc. v. Superior Court (Allstate Ins. Co.), 73 Cal. Rptr.2d 462,
466 (Cal. Ct App. 1998).
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claims using a strict "entire fairness" test, a test traditionally reserved for
duty of loyalty claims.4 Conversely, Delaware courts have held that under
certain conditions they will review duty of loyalty claims under the slack
"business judgment rule" standard traditionally applied to duty of care
claims.5 This startling reversal of review standards upends conventional
thinking about the distinctiveness of the core concepts of care and loyalty.6
More than that, it reflects the Delaware Supreme Court's quest to bring an
overarching doctrinal coherence to its fiduciary analysis of corporate director
conduct.7
Coherence in legal doctrine is an appealing idea,' especially in areas
plagued by conceptual complexity. It is thus understandable that, following
the doctrinal upheaval of corporate law in the 1980s,9 the Delaware Supreme
Court sought in the 1990s to advance a more unified framework for
reviewing challenged conduct of corporate directors.10 Analytical uniformity
is only apparently achieved, however, at an unacceptably high and
continuing cost. This cost includes the ongoing, puzzling absence in
Delaware of a fully-articulated duty of due care, an ironic outcome given the
Cede courts effort to showcase renewed attention to that much-ignored
concept. An attendant cost is the complete failure to appreciate sound,
4See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1340-41, 1345 (Del.
1987) (comparing judicial review standards and contrasting the duty of loyalty with the duty of
care); Weinbergerv. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710-11 (Del. 1983) (holding the entire fairness test
applies in a loyalty case).
-lThe business judgment rule review applies where a director's self-dealing transaction is
approved by disinterested, fully-informed directors. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366 n.34; In re
Wheelabrator Tech., Inc. Shareholders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194,1205 (Del. Ch. 1995). Butsee Cooke
v. Oolie, No. 11,134,1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at* 1, *5 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997), reprinted in 23
DEL. J. CORP. L. 775, 795-96 (1998) (applying entire fairness test to a claim of breach of director
loyalty).
6See infra text accompanying notes 17-25, 179-99.
"Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After
QVC andTechnicolor. A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAW. 1593,
1594, 1601 (1994) (arguing that from one perspective, the Delaware Supreme Court is moving
toward a single, more unified judicial review standard).
"See HAROLD J. BERmAN, LAW AND REVOLuTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 37-38 (Harvard University Press 1983) ("Law in the twentieth century, both in
theory and inpractice, has been treated less and less as a coherentwhole, a body, a corpusjuris, and
more and more as a hodgepodge, a fragmented mass of ad hoe decisions and conflicting rules, united
only by common 'techniques."').
9For a discussion of rapid doctrinal developments in Delaware corporate law in the 1980s,
see Cunningham & Yablon, supranote 7, at 1609-14; Lyman Johnson, The DelawareJudiciary and
the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEx. L. REv. 865, 910-36 (1990).
"0Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 7, at 1618-20.
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longstanding policy reasons for sharply distinguishing judicial treatment of
care and loyalty claims.1
This article will examine the Cede court's faulty decision to review
some duty of care claims under an entire fairness standard. The aim is not
merely to critique a single decision, however important, but rather to probe
more generally into the undeveloped notion of due care in Delaware
corporate law. This will be done by arguing that Cede is misguided due to
a chronic, underlying problem in Delaware law that has yet to be faced -
the steadfast refusal of either the Delaware legislature or judiciary to fully
expound a robust, all-encompassing duty of due care. Instead of facing that
fundamental, decades-long failing directly, the Cede court first shrank care
to one of its components - informedness - and then, paradoxically, sought
to reinvigorate the significance of care in Delaware law by holding, for the
first time, that breaches of its enfeebled duty of care will be strictly
scrutinized under an entire fairness standard. 2 The result is a decision
thought by the Delaware Supreme Court to be an important reprise on
director care in Delaware jurisprudence. The decision, however, actually
sets back efforts to inject a more vigorous notion of care into Delaware law,
a disquieting setback that continues to this day.
Part II of this article briefly describes, for background purposes, the
three standards ofjudicial review deployed by Delaware courts in assessing
director conduct prior to Cede. Part III then focuses on that crucial portion
of the Cede decision that purports to articulate a unified standard of review
and offers certain threshold critiques of that standard. Part IV deepens the
critique by identifying the absence of a robust duty of due care - or what
this article calls "entire care" - as the root cause of Delaware's standard of
review confusion. The argument proceeds along both doctrinal and policy
grounds and offers numerous reasons favoring a fuller expression of care.
One such reason -virtually unacknowledged in corporate law discourse -
is to recall the rich and primordial nature of care as a basic stance for
director discharge of responsibility. Finally, Part V formulates a proposal for
a general director duty of entire due care in Delaware. The proposal
advocates that the Delaware Supreme Court adopt a "prudent and
reasonable" standard for director conduct and for judicially reviewing care
claims, thereby providing what Delaware law has for too long failed to fully
verbalize - a richer, more comprehensive (yet still streamlined) duty of
entire care. Adopting the proposal will give the foundational concept of care
the prominence it deserves in Delaware law without drawing on judicial
"See infra text accompanying notes 179-99.
"Moreover, under Cede the burden of proof on entire fairness shifts to directors upon
breach of the duty of care. See infra text accompanying notes 68-76.
[Vol. 24
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practices - such as Cede's problematic burden shift and substantive judicial
review of business decisions - best reserved for the quite different policy
concerns raised by loyalty claims.
II. DELAWARE'S PRE-CEDE STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Prior to 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court used one of two judicial
standards in reviewing director conduct involving a business judgment. 3 In
1985 the court added a third, intermediate standard of review. 4 The court
readily acknowledges the often outcome-determinative nature of its disparate
review standards. 5 What follows below is a highly condensed summary of
these three standards, putting aside for now the infrequently addressed
Delaware standard for director conduct not involving an exercise of
judgment.16
A. Business Judgment Rule Review
The first standard ofjudicial review, highly deferential to directors
and their decisions, is embodied in the business judgment rule. Under this
most common standard, directors' decisions are presumed to have been made
"on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."'7  This standard
presumptively applies unless the plaintiff can demonstrate grounds for
triggering one of the other less deferential review standards. 8 The plaintiff
has the burden of proof to rebut the presumption under the business
judgment rule.19 When this standard applies -the standard most desired by
director defendants - "the Court gives great deference to the substance of
the directors' decision and will not invalidate the decision, will not examine
3See infra Parts II.A.-C.
"Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (finding an
"enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred").
l5 l1he supreme courthas acknowledged that '[b]ecause the effect of the proper invocation
of the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the
determination of the appropriate standard ofjudicial review frequently is determinative of the
outcome of derivative litigation."' Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279
(Del. 1988) (quoting A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103,111 (Del.
Ch. 1986)); accordNixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1381 (Del. 1993).
'6See infra text accompanying notes 161-67, 221-25.
17Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
"8See id; Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,42 (Del.
1993).
9Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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its reasonableness, and 'will not substitute [its] views for those of the board
if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business purpose.""'2
Rarely does a plaintiff prevail under this standard.
B. Entire Fairness Review
If the plaintiff challenges director loyalty, as by charging directors
with self-dealing of a type evidencing disloyalty, the court will abandon
business judgment review.2 In such a case, defendant-directors will bear the
burden of proof that a self-dealing transaction meets an exacting "entire
fairness" standard.' This fairness inquiry, although described as a unitary
rather than bifurcated inquiry, has both a process and a substantive
component. 2 Self-dealing directors must meet a process standard of "fair
dealing" and a qualitative standard of having achieved a "fair price" in the
business decision itself.24 Under the entire fairness standard of review, a
court will not defer to the substantive decision of directors. Rather, the court
itself must be satisfied as to the entire fairness of a challenged transaction.'
Understandably, this stringent review standard is the standard most desired
by plaintiffs.
C. Enhanced or Intermediate Review
The flurry of hostile takeovers in the 1980s led the Delaware Supreme
Court in 1985 to articulate a third review standard specially designed for
evaluating defensive measures adopted in response to or in anticipation of
a threat to corporate control.2 6 Essentially, this third review standard also
applies to a transaction involving a sale of the control of the corporation.27
a)QVCNetwork Inc., 637 A.2d at 45 n.17 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971))).
"Grabowv. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987).
',Veinbergerv. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710-11 (Del. 1983). "Entire fairness," however,
may not always be the standard of review in loyalty claims. See supra text accompanying note 5.
'Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
"41d. "Fair dealing" embodies inquiries into the timing of a transaction, how it was
negotiated, structured, disclosed to the directors, and the way in which the approvals of the
shareholders and the directors were acquired. Id. "Fair price" involves the economic and financial
considerations of the transaction, including all elements that affect the inherent stock value of a
company. Id.
' 5Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
'Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
"See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,45 (Del.
1993); see Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 7, at 1594.
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Under this threshold standard, judicial review is stricter than under ordinary
businessjudgment review, but more deferential than entire fairness review.
2
Specifically, as to a challenged defensive measure the board carries the
initial burden of proving, first, that it has "reasonable grounds for believing
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed"29 - which can
be shown by demonstrating "'good faith and reasonable investigation."3
Second, the board must prove that its chosen defensive measure was
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'" If directors overcome their
two-pronged burden, the ordinary business judgment rule review standard
is applied and the plaintiff bears the usual difficult burden of proof.32 If
directors fail to carry either of their initial burdens, the entire fairness review
standard becomes applicable and defendants bear the burden of proof under
that exacting standard.33
The word "care" does not appear in any of the three verbalized review
standards. Moreover, in first articulating the standards, the Delaware
Supreme Court did not identify the connection, if any, between the judicial
review standards and a director's duty of care. If present and in force in
Delaware law, the duty of care is left lurking beneath the surface of
expression, its shape and role either so clearly understood as to require no
delineation or so little understood as to preclude it.
I. THE CEDE UNIFIED STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Background
Five months after the publication of the Delaware Supreme Court's
opinion in Cede H, Justice Horsey, the author of the opinion, delivered a
lecture at Widener University School of Law entitled "The Duty of Care
Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule."34 In this revealing
speech (later published as an article), Justice Horsey traces the history of a
director's duty of care under Delaware law. He finds, rather surprisingly
he admits, that "[o]nly a creative reading of Delaware decisional law through
the 1950s, and usually through dicta, would arguably support a thesis that a
28QVCNetwork Inc., 637 A.2d at 42 & n.9.
29Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955.
°Id (quoting Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964)).
31Id.
32Id. at 954, 958. See infra note 213 for a critique of this "double burden" approach.
33Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1377 n.18 (Del. 1995).
'Justice Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business
Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. Corn,. L. 971 (1994).
3'See id. at 971-73.
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director ... should be held to a duty to act with care in the manner a
reasonable and prudent person would act under similar circumstances."36
Justice Horsey concludes that not until 1963 did the Delaware Supreme
Court "first recognize the existence of a director's fiduciary duty to act in an
informed and prudent manner, i.e., with due care .... "'
A judge's law review article appearing contemporaneously with an
opinion authored by him on the same subject can serve as a helpful resource
in understanding the opinion. This is the case, in two ways, with Justice
Horsey's article and opinion. First, having identified the relatively late
emergence of the duty of care in Delaware, Justice Horsey seeks to bolster
care in Delaware by linking it to the business judgment rule, a less shadowy,
more stalwart concept in Delaware corporate law.3" Although his
commendable goal is to reinvigorate the foundational concept of director
care, ironically Justice Horsey enfeebles care by conceiving of it - as the
title of his lecture-article reveals -merely as a "component" of the business
judgment rule. 9 He offers that conception of the inter-relationship of care
and the business judgment rule repeatedly and in various ways: "an
enforceable duty of care component in the Delaware business judgment
rule;"' "a duty of care component within the Delaware business judgment
rule;"'41 and "[the supreme court has] placed a concept of the standard of care
expected of directors into Delaware's business judgment rule."42 Having
made that linkage between care and the business judgment rule, his article
then describes Cede II "as a logical and predictable application of the duty
of care component of our business judgment rule as formulated.., since at
least 1963.2" In Justice Horsey's attempted reprise of care, the business
judgment rule emerges, inexplicably, as predominant, with the duty of care
supposedly bolstered even as it is subsumed under the rule itself as a
"component."
Second, having analytically subcategorized the duty of care, Justice
Horsey mysteriously abandons his earlier and proper description of care as
a duty to act "in the manner a reasonable and prudent person would act
under similar circumstances"' and ends his article with a faulty reading of
361d. at 985.
37d. (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963)).
3"See Horsey, supra note 34, at 985-91.
39Id. at 989.
41d. at 991.
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Aronson v. Lewis. 5 This reading diminishes care by making that core
concept coextensive with the informedness element found in Aronson's
flawed (but oft-cited) formulation of the business judgment rule.,, Justice
Horsey's two-step effort, first, to annex care to the business judgment rule
and, next, to begin shrinking care to informedness, also pervades his Cede
! analysis of care. Oddly, that analysis lacks any attention to the vital care
properties of "prudence" and "reasonableness" cited by Justice Horsey
himself in the first part of his article.
B. Cede Facts
The facts of the Cede litigation, which is still active after seventeen
years, are voluminous.47 Fortunately, the facts relevant to the issues
discussed in this article can be briefly stated. Technicolor, Inc. operated a
variety of businesses in the early 1980s. Its core business, however, was
film processing for motion pictures." Concerned about the growth prospects
of its core business, Morton Kamerman, Technicolor's chairman and chief
executive officer, sought to expand Technicolor into the "One-Hour-Photo"
(OHP) business. Kamerman's plan involved the opening of several
hundred stores and the investment of $150 million, a sum approximately
twice the existing shareholders' equity as of June 1982.50 Store openings did
not take place on the schedule and the stores that did open were not
profitable." By September 1982, Technicolor stock had dropped from
$22.13 to a low of $8.37per share 2 Technicolor's September 1982 annual
451d. at 996-97.
'Justice Horsey asserts that to invoke the business judgment rule a director must, among
other requirements, act "in an informed manner;, that is, in the manner originally described by our
supreme court in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers,and later applied by the court of chancery in Kaplan
[v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971)], and as later clarified by our court in Aronson v.
Lewis ...." Horsey, supra note 34, at 998. To equate acting in an "informed manner" with acting
"in the manner a reasonable and prudent person would act under similar circumstances" is not
merely a "clarified" standard of care, it is a severely truncated standard. Id. at 998, 985. For a
critique of Delaware's formulation and use of the business judgment rule, see Lyman Johnson, The
Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAw. 625 (2000).
47Jesse A. Finkelstein & Russell C. Silberglied, TechnicolorIV: Appraisal Valuation in a
Two-Step Merger, 52 Bus. LAw. 801, 801 n.5 (1997). The statement of facts provided by Messrs.
Finkelstein and Silberglied, who represented certain parties in the Cede litigation, is substantially




51Finkelstein & Silbergied, supra note 47, at 802.
52"Id
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report, however, contained a statement by Kamerman to the effect that "the
company remained optimistic about the future prospects of OBP."53
In October 1982, Kamerman met with Ronald Perelman, the
controlling shareholder of MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc. (MAF), to discuss
a possible sale of Technicolor to MAF. 4 Goldman Sachs, Technicolor's
investment banker, opined (based on somewhat limited information) that a
sale price of $20-22 was worth pursing, that $25 was a feasible price, and
that other possible purchasers should be sought. In late October 1982,
Kamerman, on behalf of Technicolor and MAF, agreed to a sale price of $23
per share.5 The form of the acquisition was that MAF would make a first-
step all-cash tender offer at $23 and then conduct a second-step merger by
which all remaining shareholders would also be cashed out at a price of $23
per share. 6 A special meeting of the Technicolor board of directors was
held just two days after Kamerman and MAF agreed on the $23 price.57 At
that meeting the board of directors approved the agreement and
recommended that Technicolor shareholders accept the agreed-upon price
and approve the merger agreement.5" Subsequently, Technicolor's
shareholders voted to approve the sale, and the sale was completed as
agreed.
5 9
Plaintiff shareholders initially filed an appraisal action against
Technicolor, and later brought a second action for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty against, among others, Technicolor, MAF, and the directors
of Technicolor.' The chancellor made, in the fiduciary duty action, what the
Delaware Supreme Court later described as "presumed findings of the
directors' failure to reach an informed decision in approving the sale of the
company."'61 The findings were described as "presumed" because, although
the chancellor found it unnecessary to make such findings as a result of
having concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove injury caused by
defendants' misbehavior, nonetheless he had "grave doubts" as to whether
the defendants had acted with due care. 2 The chancellor's doubts were
based on several predicate findings he made on the issue of director lack of
5Id.
5ld.
"Finkelstein & Silberglied, supra note 47, at 802.
'6Id.
17Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 356 (Del. 1993).
'1d. at 356-57.
59Id. at 358.
"'Id. at 349. Messrs. Finkelstein and Silberglied provide an excellent summary of the
procedural history of the ensuing litigation. Finkelstein & Silberglied, supra note 47, at 803-04.
6'Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 369-70.
62Id. at 369.
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due care.' Specifically, the chancellor found that the agreement between
Technicolor and MAF was not preceded by a "prudent search for
alternatives";' the terms and circumstances of the merger were likely to
preclude a third party from making a better offer for Technicolor;65 a
majority of the directors had little or no knowledge of the impending sale of
Technicolor until their arrival at the meeting called on short notice (and only
a few had prior knowledge of the terms of the sale);' and the board did not
meet its obligation to take reasonable steps to become adequately informed
before authorizing the merger agreement with MAF.67
C. The Cede Unified Review Standard
Cede Hand Cede 1Harticulate in a novel way the linkage between a
corporate director's fiduciary duties and a court's standards for reviewing
claims where one or more of those duties were breached.6" The court used
the business judgment rule to draw together, in a single analytical
framework, those duties and judicial review of their alleged breach. The
court in Cede Ilbegan by noting the procedural and substantive dimensions
of Delaware's business judgment rule.69 Next, the court repeated the well-
known but flawed Aronson v. Lewis formulation of that rule,70 and then
described the rule's "powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the
directors."' Finally, the court made the critical (if thin) connection between
the rule and director duties:
To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of
providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged
decisions, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty
- good faith, loyalty or due care .... Ifa shareholder plaintiff
fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the business judgment
rule attaches to protect corporate officers and directors and the
63See id.
UId.
65Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 369.
6Id.
67Id.
"Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156, 1162-63 (Del. 1995); Cede & Co.,
634 A.2d at 360-61.
"Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360. See Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1163 (explaining the
procedural and substantive dimensions of the business judgment rule).
-Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360-61. See generally infra text accompanying notes 107-18
(explaining how theAronson businessjudgment rule formulation is faulty and inconsistentwith the
larger and proper thrust of the Aronson opinion).
7"Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
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decisions they make, and our courts will not second-guess
these business judgments .... If the rule is rebutted, the
burden shifts to the defendant directors, the proponents of the
challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the "entire
fairness" of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff. 2
Under this analytical approach, the business judgment rule always
applies for the procedural purpose of assigning to the plaintiff the burden of
production and persuasion on the issue of whether a director breached one
or more duties. If the plaintiff does not meet that evidentiary burden (it
never being wholly clear what degree of judicial scrutiny is brought to this
inquiry), the substantive dimension of the business judgment rule thereupon
"attaches" to protect a director against further judicial inquiry, including
inquiry into the merits or quality of the business decision itself.73 If the
plaintiff does meet the burden assigned to him under the procedural aspect
of the business judgment rule - as by proving (by means of some unstated
degree of scrutiny) a director's breach of duty, such as care - the
substantive aspect of the rule does not apply.
The nonapplication of the substantive aspect of the business judgment
rule does not, however, according to the court in Cede J1' and Cede IIff,
itself establish the substantive liability of the director. Instead, although a
plaintiff achieves nonapplication of the substantive business judgment rule
by proving a breach of duty, the breach itself does not substantively go
beyond that effect. Rather, at this stage, it merely has the further procedural
effect of shifting to the defendants the burden of proving the entire fairness
of a challenged transaction. 6 Substantive director liability and the damages
outcome of the case turn on whether, subsequently, a defendant successfully
carries that high burden. In short, a proven duty of care breach results not
in liability, but in application of the entire fairness review standard, the same
standard traditionally reserved for determining whether a director violated
the duty of loyalty.
D. Opening Critique
Although Cede apparently brings succinct rhetorical coherence to




7"Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995).
76Id.
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director duties and the business judgment rule is initially problematic on two
grounds.
First, none of the authority cited in either Cede I!or Cede 1I supports
the novel proposition that, in a duty of care case, a director must carry the
burden of proving the entire fairness of a challenged transaction.' The court
is far too careless and cavalier about this vital point. Cede Iff cites as
authority for its holding a footnote collecting cases in Unitrin, Inc. v.
American General Corp.7" The first case quoted in the Unitrin footnote,
Grobow v. Perot,79 involved the issue of whether pre-suit demand in a
derivative action was excused. Grobow, in turn, simply cited Aronson v.
Lewis,"o another case addressing demand futility which states the
uncontroversial rule that business judgment review has no application when
director self-interest is present (i.e., when loyalty is at issue)."1 The other
two decisions cited in the Unitrin footnote, Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc.2 and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 3 both involved director
self-interest and thus implicate director loyalty, not simply care.'" Likewise,
the Delaware Supreme Court decisions cited in Cede 1I to support the
proposition that in a duty of care case the defendant directors have the
burden of proving the entire fairness of a transaction, all involved director
self-interest, thus again implicating loyalty and not merely care."5
7'Professors Cunningham and Yablon agree with this article's position that Cede & Co.
represents a "novel holding" on this point. Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 7, at 1596. As
recently as 1993, one of the leading treatises on Delaware law stated, contrary to the as yet
undecided Cede & Co. opinion, that the effect ofa plaintiffovercoming the presumption ofdue care
was that the burden shifted to defendant directors to prove they acted with the "requisite degree of
care." DENNISJ.BLOCKETAL.,THEBUSNESSJUDGMENTRULE: FIDucLARYDUTIEs oFCRPoRATE
DECTORS 53-54 (4th ed. 1993) (citing Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d
264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986)). Rather than a burden to "prove" due care, such a burden is better
understood as one of production, with the ultimate burden of persuasion remaining with the plaintiff.
The chief point, however, is that the experienced treatise writers rightly regarded the issue as
remaining a care issue throughout, not as one transmuting into a fairness inquiry. See NCR Corp.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 761 F. Supp. 475,490 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (properly describing effect
of plaintiff rebutting initial presumption).
7Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1162 (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1371 n.7 (Del. 1995) (collecting cases)).
79539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988).
'473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
811d. at 812.
-l559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988).
457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983).
'For further discussion of the Macmillan case, see infra note 85.
'Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citing Nixon v.
Blackweil, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1279 (Del. 1988); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)). Later in the
Cede H opinion, the court cites a court of chancery decision, Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid
Corp., 559 A.2d 257,271 (Del. Ch. 1989), in support of entire fairness review where director care
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The Cede III court strained to read its decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom as holding that when the business judgment rule is inapplicable
because directors were uninformed, the applicable standard of review is
entire fairness.86 The problem is that Van Gorkom never said anything like
that. The Cede m1 opinion tries to skirt that fact by a revisionist reading of
Van Gorkom as a case where, purportedly, the Delaware Supreme Court
itself decided the substantive entire fairness issue adversely to the directors
because a duty of disclosure breach (a duty grounded in loyalty as well as
care) compounded the duty of care breach in that case.87 That very
difference, however, supports the point that Van Gorkom is not authority for
applying the entire fairness standard where only a duty of care breach
exists." The better interpretation of Van Gorkom, as a combined breach of
the duty of disclosure and the duty of care case, seems especially likely given
has been breached. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 368,371. Shamrock Holdings never found a breach
of duty of care because then Vice-Chancellor Berger concluded it was not "necessary to the
disposition ofthis case." ShamrockHoldings, 559 A.2d at 271. The Shamrock court indicated that
fairness is the applicable test where a board fails to become informed. Id. The Shamrock court
cited, in support, Macmillan, 550 A.2d 35 (summary disposition), a decision which, when the
Shamrock opinion was written, had only orally been ruled on, the written opinion not being handed
down until four months after Berger's opinion. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
Macmillan itself involved a sale transaction in which certain directors who had significant
self-interest illicitly manipulated the board's decision-making process. Id. at 1265-78. That self-
interest seemed critical (notwithstanding the board's larger abdication of responsibility for
supervising the sale process) to the court's application ofentire fairness review. Moreover, the court
described the conduct ofthe disinterested board members in abandoning their oversight function as
a breach of care and loyalty. Id. at 1284 n.32.
The Shamrock court also cited dictum from Unocal to the effect that a court will not
substitute its judgment for aboard's "unless itis shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
directors' decisions were primarilybased on perpetuating themselves in office, or some otherbreach
of fiduciary duty such as ... being uninformed." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 958 (Del. 1985). The Unocal court nowhere mentioned the fairness test in conjunction with
that remark, nor were any case citations given in support of it. Both the thrust and context of the
remark indicate simply that the business judgment rule precludes court substitution of its judgment
for that of the board where, as in Unocal, there is no breach of duty.
Vice-Chancellor Berger's final case authority in Shamrock Holdings was Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985), which itself is possibly the underlying case behind the
dictum in Unocal, Van Gorkom having only been decided a few months before Unocal. Shamrock
Holdings, 559 A.2d at 271. For reasons why Van Gorkom does not support application of an entire
fairness review standard in a breach of duty of care case, see infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
'Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995). Cede II describes
Van Gorkom only very cryptically on this point. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 368, 371.
'Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1166.
SSIhe duty of disclosure itself arises under "[a] combination of the fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty." lI at 1163 (citing Zim v. VI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993)). Recently, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated that "[tlhe duty of directors to observe proper disclosure
requirements derives from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith."
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998).
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that a duty of disclosure breach uniquely results in "a virtualper se rule of
[awarding] damages."89 Indeed, the opinion in Cede III includes, in its
reinterpretation of Van Gorkom, a citation to the very case establishing this
principle of per se damages."
The fact remains that no clear and reasoned prior authority exists for
the Cede 11 and Cede 11 holdings that director breach of the duty of care
results in application of an exacting entire fairness analysis. Moreover, the
Delaware Supreme Court opinions and the chancery court's opinion in
Shamrock Holdings are utterly devoid of any attempt at explaining why, on
policy grounds, care claims should receive the same searching substantive
review traditionally reserved for loyalty claims. Director carelessness does
not doctrinally, logically, or policy-wise, necessitate that a burden of proof
shift to the defendants accompanied by close judicial scrutiny of the quality
or merits of a business decision.91 This remains true even if the protective
presumptions of the business judgment rule are overcome. With or without
the rule, the case remains one of director carelessness, not disloyalty.
The failure by the Cede court to elaborate policy rationales for
stringently reviewing care claims in the manner of loyalty claims may simply
be because adjudicated breaches of the duty of care have been so rare in
Delaware that the courts have had little occasion to develop more nuanced
standards for addressing them. Or, it may reflect an overly hasty zeal for
embracing a coherent and unified fiduciary analysis,' such zeal leading the
court to treat all duty breaches the same, as if their policy roots were
indistinguishable. Two deeper reasons for the confusion are developed
shortly but warrant mention here.' The first is the courfs faulty equating of
a director's informedness with a director's duty of care (thereby not grasping
the genuine fullness of a due care inquiry).94 The second reason is Justice
Horsey's overarching quest - seen as well in his lecture-article - to give
"In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993). At least this is the
case where the nondisclosure "caused impairmentto the economic orvotingrights ofstockholders."
Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 142 (Del. 1997).
"Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1166 (citing In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d
319 (Del. 1993)). This point was not made in Cede II, a case decided before Tri-Star Pictures.
Recent Delaware Supreme Court opinions describe Van Gorkom as holding that directors in that
case breached the duty of disclosure as well as the duty of care. Malone, 722 A.2d at 11 n.21;
Loudon, 700 A.2d at 142 n.24.
9"See infira text accompanying notes 130-99. A recent decision by the Connecticut Supreme
Courtrejected a claimthatprovingnegligence in a fiduciary's administration ofan estate would shift
to the fiduciary the burden to prove fairness, holding that such a burden shift would require a prior
showing of fraud, self-dealing, or conflict of interest. Murphy v. Wakelee, 721 A.2d 1181, 1186
(Conn. 1998).
92See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
93See infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
"See infra text accompanying notes 107-21.
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Delaware's duty of care a shot in the arm, to the point of inappropriately
applying a novel heightened burden of proof in what amounts to a
carelessness claim.95
The second problem with Cede's quest for rhetorical coherence is that
the business judgment rule is ill-equipped to serve as the umbrella concept
for analytically linking director duties (care, loyalty, and good faith) with
standards of judicial review. This flaw permeates Justice Horsey's lecture-
article as well as his judicial opinion.9" His Cede 11 opinion wrongly
subsumes director duties under a rule (really, a policy of review) that is
narrower in scope than the duties themselves, repeatedly mentioning what
he calls "the duty of care element of the rule."'97 Both the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty govern corporate directors whether or not directors make
business decisions, while the business judgment rule applies only when
directors do make such decisions.98 As a much narrower legal notion than
the broad duties of care, loyalty, and good faith, the business judgment rule
95See Horsey, supra note 34, at 971-73.
'See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Horsey, supra note 34.
-'Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43. This
unfortunate phraseology seems to originate with Samuel Arsht's well-known article on the Delaware
business judgment rule. S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 93 (1979). In arguing that the business judgment rule presupposes the exercise of due care,
Mr. Arsht, an experienced corporate lawyer, blithely refers to "the rule's standard-of-care element."
Id. at 119. Justice Horsey's article openly draws on Mr. Arsht's work. Horsey, supra note 34, at
978, 994-96. Moreover, Justice Horsey believed that Mr. Arsht's views played a role in the
Delaware Supreme Court's subsequent formulation of the business judgment rule in Aronson v.
Lewis. Id at 996. Justice Horsey's position on Mr. Arsht's influence appears sound, for Mr. Arsht
emphasizes that due care requires gaining "all relevant facts" and sums up that: "It is one thing to
make a decision, and another thing to make an informed decision. It is only the latter type of
decision that the business judgment rule protects." Arsht, supra, at 119-120. The regrettable
tendency to equate due care with informedness in Delaware, therefore, may stem from a well-
intentioned, but thoughtless, conceptualizing of care as an "element" of the business judgment rule.
This characterization may have originated with Mr. Arsht, found doctrinal expression inAronson,
and gained important reinforcement from Justice Horsey and Cede 11. See infra note 107.
There is a substantial collection of commentary on the corporate law duty of care. See
Arsht, supra note 97, at 120 n.118; Horsey, supra note 34, at 977-79 & n.20. Professor Stuart Cohn
provides an excellent discussion of the "demise" of care in corporate law and the blurring of its
relationship with the business judgment rule. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of
Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62
T X. L. Rv. 591, 594, 602-07 (1983). Justice Horsey acknowledges Professor Cohn's article,
Horsey, supra note 34, at 979-80. However, Justice Horsey does not address Cohn's telling
observation that due care had become "enveloped" in the business judgment rule. Cohn, supra, at
594. Horsey's "component" language actually exacerbates the problem.
See also William L. Cary & Sam Harris, Standards of Conduct Under Common Law,
Present Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAW. 61, 70 (1972) (suggesting that "the
distinction between the business judgment rule and the negligence rule... which is already
somewhat obscure, will largely vanish"). A more recent treatment of care includes Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PiTt. L. REV. 945 (1990).
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should not be made the chief rhetorical or analytical vessel either for
reinvigorating the duty of care or for unifying the judiciary's fiduciary
analysis of director conduct. The result will either be to mistakenly contract
the pervasive duty of due care to fit the business judgment rule framework,
or eventually to regard the new framework as considerably less-
encompassing than might initially appear. Thus, to cite just one example,
breaches of the duty of care resulting from faulty director monitoring, where
no identifiable business judgments were made, do not fit into a formulation
that analytically subsumes the richer duty of care under the important but
more confined business judgment rubric." Coherence and unity in any
intellectual endeavor require that the special (here, the business judgment
rule) be an instance of the general (here, the duty of due care), not vice
versa.
Moreover, there is no reason why, as in Cede Ii, the effect of a
proven care breach is described as having "rebutted" the business judgment
rule and thereby depicted only in procedural terms of effecting a threshold
change in the standard ofjudicial review."° The result is that an established
duty of care breach has no legal consequences until the ensuing entire
fairness review is completed. Contrary to Justice Horsey's intent, this
approach does not rejuvenate the duty of care. Instead, the judicial move of
giving a proven director care breach only the procedural effect of applying
a second, more exacting review standard originally designed solely for
loyalty claims, actually drains distinctive meaning from the notion of care,
within as well as outside the business judgment context.
IV. A DEEPER CRITIQUE OF CEDE- THE SHRINKING OF DUE CARE
A. Due Care in Cede
The Cede court not only rhetorically subsumed care (a pervasive duty)
under the business judgment rule (a specialized judicial review policy), but
also wrongly correlated the duty of due care with the informedness element
of the business judgment rule. The truncation of care to informedness can
be seen in its quotation of an earlier opinion in which the well-known
Aronson formulation of the business judgment rule was recast as follows:
The business judgment rule "creates a 'presumption that in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis
"'See infra text accompanying notes 161-67, 221-25.
"I°Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995).
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[i.e., with due care]' .... "'0' Later the Cede !!court stated, "[Tlhe defendant
directors were grossly negligent in failing to reach an informed decision
when they approved the agreement of merger, and... have thereby breached
their duty of care."" Lest one conclude from this passage that care was
breached only because informedness is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to acting with care, the court found that a board will not have
"breached its duty of care unless the directors individually and the board
collectively have failed to inform themselves fully and in a deliberate
manner .... Only on such ajudicial finding will a board lose the protection
of the business judgment rule under the duty of care element ....
Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the chancellor's presumed
finding that the directors were not fully informed, the chancellor also
wrongly having made care and informedness coextensive as follows: "the
due care theory and the Revlon theory do not present two separate legal
theories justifying shareholder recovery.... [B]oth theories reduce to a
claim that directors were inadequately informed .... 104
The result of this conflation is that, because the procedural effect of
the business judgment rule is to place on the plaintiff the burden of rebutting
the presumption of director informedness, a plaintiffs failure to do so means
the substantive effect of the business judgment rule "attaches." This, in turn,
not only means that a court will not inquire into the substantive quality of the
business decision at all (or will inquire only for irrationality), 5 but it also
means that a court might not inquire into the decision-making process to
determine whether a director acted carelessly in a manner other than
informedness. In other words, a plaintiffs failure to carry his or her burden
on the issue of director informedness conceivably ends further judicial
inquiry into any other aspect of director due care, confining judicial review
thereafter to a mild form of substantive business decision review. The
peculiar upshot of this is that an informed director could act in a way not
reasonably related to (or wholly without regard to) the information at hand,
or act carelessly in some manner other than informedness, without judicial
sanction. In this scenario, equating care and informedness leads to judicial
review that might be too deferential.
Conversely, after Cede, if the plaintiff does prove lack of full
informedness, such proof alone apparently constitutes a breach of due care.
...Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (quoting Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989)).
'02d. at 366.
'Id. at 368 (emphasis added).
°41d. at 369-70 n.37 (emphasis added).
° 'See supra text accompanying note 20. For a critique of the "rationality" review in the
business judgment setting, see infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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The defendant thereupon is assigned the burden of proving "entire fairness"
of the transaction, one aspect of which is proving substantive fairness of the
business transaction. In this scenario, equating care and informedness leads
to judicial review that is too demanding.
The result under Cede is that a plaintiffs showing on one matter
informedness - leads either to little or no inquiry into the substantive
business decision or to a very exacting inquiry. These quite disparate
standards ofjudicial scrutiny in the care setting stem from the faulty ruling
that a plaintiffs proof of a breach of due care claim turns solely on
demonstrating the nonexistence of one element - informedness - in the
business judgment rule. This mistaken correlation of due care with the
informedness element of that rule is one more reason, as argued earlier,'06
not to rhetorically subsume the richer duty of care under the business
judgment rule. Indeed, the wrongful equating in Cede probably is a direct
result of that confusing subjunction; once the duty of care is
methodologically subsumed in the business judgment rule framework, the
scope of the duty might thoughtlessly be compressed into that framework's
existing (but smaller) category of informedness.
B. Restoring Due Care
The conflating of care and informedness found in Cede distorts
existing Delaware doctrine, although Delaware's continuing failure to
articulate a robust, all-encompassing duty of care underlies and contributes
to the error. The only alternative conclusion is the disturbing one that there
really is no director duty of care in the decision-making context in Delaware,
at least beyond a duty simply to be informed.
One likely cause for doctrinal confusion about the duty of care in
Delaware law can be traced to the modem expression of the business
judgment rule as formulated in Aronson. 7 In that case, the business rule is
described, in part, as a "presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis." ' The court in
I°6See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
1aTheAronson decision itself, as pointed out earlier, supra note 97, seems to build on
Samuel Arsht's rather pointed emphasis on informedness, as well as a 1977 statement ofthe General
Corporation Law Committee of the Delaware State Bar that the business judgment rule would only
apply to decision makers who "paid informed attention to their duties." Resource Document on
Delaware Corporation Law, 2 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 176,186 (1977). See also Kaplan v. Centex Corp.,
284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (stating that business judgment rule "depends upon a showing
that informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment"). Aronson cites to the Kaplan
passage just-quoted immediately afterAronson's famous formulation ofthe business judgment rule
as including a presumption of informedness. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
'Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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Aronson, however, goes on to place the concept of informedness into the
larger context of care."° The court makes clear that "directors have a duty
to inform themselves... of all material information reasonably available to
them.""' After directors have "become so informed, they must then act with
requisite care in the discharge of their duties.""' The court goes on to state
that although a "variety of terms""' have been used to "describe the
applicable standard of care" ' (note that the court's reference is to "care" not
"informedness") the best view is that "under the business judgment rule
director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.""'
In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court clearly distinguishes the
step of becoming informed from the larger process of directors subsequently
acting with "requisite care in the discharge of their duties.""' 5 That
difference having been noted, the court's oft-quoted earlier formulation of
the business judgment rule should have been phrased as - or at least should
properly be understood as - a presumption that directors "acted with due
care""16 or "acted with due care on an informed basis.""7 That much-needed
clarification would analytically differentiate one facet of (or predicate to)
acting with care - being informed - from the notion of care itself"' and
1091d. at 812-13.
"0 d.
.Id (emphasis added). Cede H cites the indicated language of Aronson, but then sums
up the duty of care as a duty "to act on an informed basis," Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993), ignoringAronson's requirement that directors "act with requisite care"
once they are informed. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (emphasis added).
"'Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
13Id.
14Id.
.'Id The court stated that after becoming informed, directors must "then act" with
requisite care. Id.
"6An example of such a proper and more accurate formulation of the business judgment
rule was provided by Chief Justice Veasey, when recently in dictum he re-phrased Aronson as
follows: "The business judgment rule is a presumption that directors are acting independently, in
good faith and with due care in making a business decision." Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695
A.2d 43,49 (Del. 1997). Vice-ChancellorJacobs evenmorepointedlyre-castAronson: "[Olur law
presumes that in making a [business decision.. ., the directors acted with due care and in good
faith to advance the best interests of shareholders." Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 689
(Del. Ch. 1996). Thekeytothoseproperverbalformulations isthatthey must genuinely regard due
care in the richer sense argued for in the text, not as equivalent only to informedness, as in Citron.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text
.. Chief Justice Veasey has captured the distinction made by Aronson between becoming
informed and thereafter acting with care when he describes a director as having a two-fold
obligation "to obtain, and act with due care on, all material information reasonably available."
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,48 (Del. 1993).
". Writing elsewhere, ChiefJustice Veasey refrains from equating care and informedness
by rightly viewing care as including (but not being limited to) informedness: "The duty of care
includes the requirement that directors inform themselves of all material information reasonably
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avoid a wrong belief that the larger care analysis is exhausted with the
informedness inquiry under the business judgment rule.
Restoring due care as a meaningful cornerstone of Delaware law will
require the plaintiff (and the court) to address not only the directors' state of
informedness, but also, critically, whether directors acted with due care in
light of that information. At a fundamental level, this will require the
Delaware Supreme Court to finally elaborate on the concept of due care. As
this article will argue," 9 due care requires directors at all times to act with
the care an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position under similar circumstances. In the business
judgment setting, the due care inquiry should focus on the totality of the
board's decision-making process." Resolution of the care issue in the
business judgment context, therefore, will not turn on the state of director
informedness standing in isolation, but on whether the board used a
reasonable decision-making process in arriving at a decision.
A key part of that investigation would be whether the extent, type,
source, reliability, presentation, and use of information - not simply its
possession and assimilation - were appropriate under the circumstances of
the particular decision. This, in turn, requires evaluation of many factors
such as time constraints, costs, subject matter and magnitude of the decision,
other rightful contemporaneous demands on directors' attention, the pre-
existing state of director knowledge of the overall business and of the
particular matter under consideration, director views on likely growth and
future prospects, anticipated disruption for employees and customers
resulting from either an actual combination or protracted hostilities, and
probably several other factors as well. In short, although being properly
available to them before making a business decision." E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension
in Corporate Governance in America, 52 Bus. LAW. 393, 397-98 (1997). The seminal case on
director informedness -Smith v. Van Gorkom - also described the director's duty to exercise an
informed business judgment as being "in the nature ofa duty of care," pointedly not describing that
obligation as being "the" duty of care. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
Moreover, in adopting a gross negligence standard for the informedness issue, the court in Van
Gorkom cited Aronson as having adopted a gross negligence standard for care, then went on to
"confirm thatview" and, subsequently, stated that gross negligence would "also" be the standard on
the informedness issue. Id. at 873. Once again, this reveals a judicial effort to articulate a
distinction between care and informedness.
"-See infra Part V.
I'The Delaware Supreme Court occasionally makes strong statements that the due care
inquiryin the businessjudgment contextshould focus on aboard's decision-making process, as seen
in the following: "[O]ur due care examination has focused on a board's decision-making process."
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp. 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989). Largely, however, the
process inquiry, as in Cede, too often becomes an inquiry into the board's state of informedness.
Samuel Arsht, rather tersely, and Professor Cohn, more extensively, advocate judicial attention to
a board's larger decision-making process. See Arsht, supra note 97, at 100; Cohn, supra note 98,
at 605-07.
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informed is an essential aspect of due care, it does not exhaust that duty.
Nor can due care be understood in a contextual vacuum. The requirement,
after all, is not care alone, but "due" care, that is, the care sufficient for, and
properly proportioned and owed to, the particular situation. Moreover, even
the informedness element itself is qualified in Aronson by the concepts of
materiality and reasonableness,' concepts that take on meaning only in a
larger context. Informedness, then, is best understood as a key, but by itself,
insufficient ingredient in the larger inquiry into the reasonableness of the
overall decision-making process undertaken by directors.
C. A Broader Due Care Duty
1. The Meaning(s) of Care
Far from being a simple concept, care is multidimensional. At least
three meanings of care are relevant to corporate law. First section 141(a) of
the Delaware General Corporations Law places the business and affairs of
a corporation under the "direction" of a board of directors."2 "Direction"
means the guidance and supervision of action or conduct," one meaning as
well of "care," as in the phrase "under a doctor's care."'2 4 In corporate law
then, by statute, the business and affairs of a corporation are "under the
board of directors' care." The board therefore is to "take care of' the
corporation's business and affairs. Director neglect of corporate affairs, or
a director's abdication of his or her duties, is a violation of care in this most
fundamental, statutory sense. It is a failure to direct, or "take care of," the
corporation.
Second, besides taking "care of' a corporation's business and affairs,
a board in doing so is to "care for" the interests of the corporate enterprise
and its shareholders. That is, the affirmative object of director attention and
energy must be the enterprise and its shareholders, not the directors' interests
or those of any other third party. Unconsidered director neglect violates this
obligation of care because it is a failure to "care for" the enterprise and its
shareholders. Equally important a director acting out of self-interest
(disloyally) or out of a motive other than the interest of the corporate
enterprise and shareholders (bad faith), also is failing to "care for" the proper
interests. In this sense, care as solicitudefor the interests of the enterprise
"'Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
1"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1998).
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and shareholders is the foundation of the notions of loyalty and good faith."z
A director simply cannot discharge the obligation to "care for" the
corporation and its shareholders by serving, instead, his or her own, or
another party's interests. In fact, this facet of care - concern and solicitude
- is sufficiently fundamental and sufficiently different from yet a third
meaning of care - acting "with care" - that the altogether different
terminology of loyalty and good faith are used to more sharply capture this
second meaning.
Third, directors are not only to "take care of' and "care for" the
corporation and its shareholders, but when doing so they are to act "with
care." That is, directors are to act "carefully" or in a careful manner. One
can "care for" (as by being concerned about) the interests of another without
necessarily acting "with care" regarding those interests. Likewise, one can
behave "with care" without acting out of "care for" the interests of another.
A hired driver, for example, may operate a vehicle with great care - i.e.,
carefully - although he or she does not "care for" the welfare of the
passenger in that the driver may proceed to the destination that he or she,
rather than the passenger, prefers.
The point here is that, far from being a thin concept, care in corporate
law, as in human existence generally, is a rich and primordial concept." It
is such a first-order concept that, for the most part, the first two meanings
generally are not at issue and can often safely be assumed. Thus, when a
board takes considered action (or considered inaction), there is no care issue
in the first sense. By way of contrast, in a board abdication case there is a
fundamental failure to direct or "take care of" the corporation in just that
basic sense. 7 Unless loyalty or bad faith is pointedly the issue, generally
care in the second sense - "care for" - likewise is not often at stake. This
is easily seen, for example, in the old charitable contribution cases and the
more recent hostile takeover cases involving board-adopted antitakeover
'the Delaware Supreme Court once described the conduct of disinterested directors who
abandoned their oversight responsibilities as a breach of their duties of care and loyalty. Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.32 (Del. 1988). Such abdication so
fundamentally violates care in the first and second senses that it constitutes disloyalty to the intended
recipients of director attention, even without director self-interest. This is seen as well in one
sometimes-forgotten clause in a larger famous passage about director loyalty in Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
5 A.2d 503,510 (Del. 1939) (finding a director under the duty "affirmatively to protect the interests
ofthe corporation committed to his charge."). The court in Unocal described the "fundamental duty
and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise" as a "duty of care." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
"'his is the point ofthe fable of Care in the Introduction to this article. Indeed, human
careunderstood ontologically (notmerelypsychologically) is regarded by Martin Heidegger as such
"aprimordial structural totality," that"Being must be defined as'care."' MARTINHEIDEGGER, BEING
AD TIam 238 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Harper & Row 1962) (1927).
'See supra note 125.
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measures where the second meaning of care was brought into sharp issue
and debate." The issue is the very basic one of whether these actions are
consistent with "caring for" the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. Answering this complex social policy question requires very
different judicial involvement" than answering, as in the third sense of care,
whether or not the directors acted "with care."
That leaves the third sense of care - are directors acting "with care"
- as the predominant part of the due care inquiry. It is a qualitatively
different, less foundational inquiry than the first two. Judicial review of
director care in this sense should, therefore, focus on the manner in which
directors acted, because the duty of due care so understood is a duty to
conduct oneself in a certain (careful) manner. This manner includes, but
goes beyond, proper informedness:
2. Benefits of a Broader Due Care Duty
Due care as both a more inclusive notion than informedness and as
having broader application than the business judgment setting should be
clearly instilled in Delaware law. The duty of due care - which applies to
all directors at all times - is a duty to act "with care" and is easy to state.
It is a duty to act with the care an ordinarily prudent person would
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position under similar
circumstances. 3 ° Specifically, in the business judgment context, the
business judgment review standard would include a presumption that
directors acted with due care (i.e., with a reasonable overall decision-making
process). The contours of the proposed due care duty are more fully
developed in Part V. The remainder of Part IV identifies several reasons for
expressly implanting in Delaware law such a concept of due care.
... Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial And Legislative Notions Of
Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CoRP. L 35, 42-61 (1988). A contemporary setting where the
duties of loyalty and good faith- i.e., care as to "care for"- will be contested and closely analyzed
involves claims for damages against directors where the duty of care is unavailable (or is
unattractive) as a theory ofrecovery due to an exculpatory provision adopted pursuant to § 102(b)(7)
of the Delaware Corporations statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1998). See, e.g.,
Goodwin v. Live Entertainment, Inc., No. 15,765 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 1999), reprinted in 24 DEL. 3.
CORP. L. 1084 (1999). See infra note 190.
'29See Johnson, supra note 9, at 910-36.
'3 Common law recognizes a duty of care. Cohn, supra note 98, at 602-03 & nn.39-45.
Delaware law appears to be in accord, see infra note 162 and accompanying text, although such a
full description of care appears with startling infrequency.
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a. Doctrinal Assertions About Informedness
First, a more general duty of due care would serve to illuminate
certain doctrinal assertions in Delaware law. An example of a problem with
focusing on director informedness in isolation is found in the important cases
of Aronson v. Lewis' and Smith v. Van Gorkom. ' In both cases, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated that a director's decision is an informed one
if directors have informed themselves "of all material information reasonably
available to them.""' The Van Gorkom court additionally ruled that gross
negligence is the proper standard for determining whether a decision was an
informed one.134
The latter standard necessarily means directors have considerable
latitude in their information gathering efforts and will not literally be
required to have "all material information reasonably available" or lose the
case. Nor will directors lose even if they were negligent or acted
unreasonably in their efforts at becoming informed because a gross
negligence standard is meant to provide greater leeway.'35 If so, a duty of
care case will not stand or fall based only on the court ascertaining whether
the specified amount of information has been obtained - i.e., all material
information reasonably available - but on whether "enough" information
was gathered to satisfy a director's obligation not to have acted with gross
negligence in becoming informed. 36 Being held to a stated "reasonableness"
standard and being held to a lesser standard that one not be grossly negligent
in deviating from the stated standard are two different legal measures.
3 7
11473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
13488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
'Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
114d. at 873.
"In criticizing a "reasonable person" standard as lacking precision, the Delaware Supreme
Court in Cede Hinterpreted such a standard as protecting "all director action not constituting gross
negligence," not "only director actions that do not constitute simple negligence." Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,364 n.31 (Del. 1993). Clearly, the court intends to allow directors
more leeway than simple negligence. For a critique ofa gross negligence standard as confusing, see
Arsht, supra note 97, at 120-21 n.119; see also E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified
Standard- Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reej? An Analysis of the ModelAct Standard of Care
Compared With Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAw. 919, 928 (1980) (noting the confusion and
differentiation between "gross" and "ordinary negligence" as the applicable standard).
1'his exact distinction was made by defendants in Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid
Corp., 559 A.2d 257,270 (Del. Ch. 1989). Faced in that case with the reality that they "did not
know all ofthe relevant facts[,]" defendants argued thatboard failure to become fully informed does
notresult in loss ofbusinessjudgmentrule protection "unless its lack ofinformation was so extreme
as to reflect gross negligence on the part of the directors." I The vice-chancellor did not resolve
the argument.
"'See supra note 135.
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Moreover, no matter how the standard of informedness is verbally
expressed, the legal sufficiency of a director's degree of informedness is
never an abstract or purely quantitative inquiry. Rather, it is one that
necessarily sets director culpability on the informedness question into the
fuller milieu of the overall decision-making process on a particular matter.
"Materiality" and "reasonableness" are unavoidably context-bound, as is the
overarching question of whether the care given to, among other matters,
director informedness was that "due" under the totality of circumstances.
The key determination is whether, overall, the directors acted with "due"
care, that is, in examining their behavior as a whole, did they act with "entire
care.
1 38
A more explicit broadened notion of due care also allows
reconciliation of various doctrinal assertions by the Delaware Supreme Court
on the relationship of information to the larger decision-making context.
The impact of discrete items of information and other factors must always
be, when assessing the legal sufficiency of director conduct, "considered in
light of the whole case."'39 The 1974 case of Gimbel v. Signal Companies,
Inc.,"4 cited in Van Gorkom,'"' quotes from the 1933 decision of Mitchell
v. Highland-Western Glass Co.142 (also cited in Van Gorkom) to the effect
that a court should ask whether certain information deficiencies, "considered
in light of the whole case,"'" justify the conclusion that 'directors acted so
far without information that they can be said to have passed an unintelligent
and unadvised judgment.""'  The Gimbel court went on to frame the
pertinent inquiry in a manner also quoted approvingly in Van Gorkom,
45
that being whether, in light of the 'full circumstances[,] ... did the Signal
directors act without the bounds of reason and recklessly?" 46 This is not a
review of the substance of the decision itself, but of the manner in which
directors acted under the "full circumstances" of the decision-making
context. Since this is a process inquiry, a reviewing court must consider
"3 l'he term "entire care" is meant to be the analogue, in care analysis, to the term "entire
fairness" first coined by the Delaware Supreme Court in the loyalty setting. Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983).
"9Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974), affdper curium, 316 A.2d
619 (Del. 1974).
14Id.
'"Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 n.13 (Del. 1985).
142167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933).
'4'Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 615.
'441d. (quoting Mitchell, 167 A. at 833 (emphasis added)).
141Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 n.13.
' Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 615 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 24
1moiNG JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DIRECTOR CARE
evidence of the directors' entire decision-making process, a "whole record"
review standard, to borrow a phrase from administrative law.1
47
The case authority cited by Van Gorkom supports the view that such
a process inquiry can only be done in the context of the directors' assessment
of the "entire situation."'1' The importance of director conduct in addition
to the gathering of information is also visible in Van Gorkom's admonition
that directors must "proceed with a critical eye in assessing information of
the type and under the circumstances present here."'4  When information is
"assessed," it is analyzed in a deliberate and disciplined manner. Due care,
therefore, includes obtaining, analyzing, and bringing -considered
deliberation to,' all reasonably available material information prior to the
exercise ofjudgment.' Were this not the case, the word 'judgment" would
mean little more than the formal utterance of a decision, rather than the
intellectual process of forming an opinion through deliberation on all
material information. It is the latter 'judgment" that shareholders and society
at large seek and expect from directors.
The context-sensitive nature of the informedness inquiry, as well as
the fact that the informedness requirement is only one component of due
care, was recognized by the Delaware Supreme Court in its 1994 statement
that "the circumstances of each particular case will determine the steps that
a board must take to inform itself, and what other action, ifany, is required
as a matter offiduciary duty."'5 2 Later in that same opinion, the court
described directors' duties "to obtain, and act with due care on, all material
' 7"Whole record" review is an administrative law concept found in the Administrative
Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 706 (1994). See Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951); BERNARD SCHWAR:Tz, ADMINSTRATIVELAW § 10.7 (3d
ed. 1991). Unlike in administrative law, however, where the courtreviewing administrative agency
action is to look at the "whole record," in corporate law the reviewing court should examine whether
the directors looked at the "whole record," i.e., what Chief Justice Veasey once called the directors'
analysis of"the entire situation." Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1993).
I4SQVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 44.
49 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (emphasis added).
"See infra text accompanying note 160; Cohn, supra note 98, at 615; see also Panter v.
MarshallField & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 306 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (Judge
Cudahy, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the "bloard gave the CHH merger
proposal no bona fide consideration").
1'Van Gorkom clearly states that a director has a duty "to act in an informed and deliberate
manner." Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. Cede 11, citing Van Gorkom, subtly distorts the quoted
language in a way that alters the dual nature of the directors' duty so that it becomes a duty "to
inform themselves fully and in a deliberate manner." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 368 (Del. 1993). Whereas Van Gorkom differentiates "informed" and "deliberate," Cede 11
converts "deliberate" into a description of how directors are to inform themselves. Id.
"'QVCNetwork, Inc., 637 A.2d at 43 n.13 (emphasis added).
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information reasonably available."'" That statement - made prior to Cede
Ill- reflects the courts appreciation that due care properly includes, but is
not limited to, the informedness inquiry, as Cede and certain antecedent
decisions wrongly suggest. Moreover, this view rightly regards the exercise
of such due care as an essential precondition to the decision - upholding
protection of the business judgment rule.
1 1
4
The contextual nature of any judicial assessment of director conduct
was succinctly captured by Chancellor Allen in stating that "inquiries
concerning fiduciary duties are inherently particularized and contextual."'
55
This belief about judicial review of director conduct is further reinforced by
the Delaware Supreme Court's statement in Barkan v. Amsted Industries,
Inc.156 that "a board's actions must be evaluated in light of relevant
circumstances to determine if they were undertaken with due diligence and
in good faith."'5 The court pointedly applied this to the informedness
inquiry, stating that "[t]he need for adequate information is central to the
enlightened evaluation of a transaction" by a board,' while recognizing
"there is no single method that a board must employ to acquire such
information."'59 The key judicial inquiry is the soundness of a board's
overall decision-making process (in practice and necessity a multifactor
analysis), an inquiry designed, ultimately, to determine "whether a board has
acted in a deliberate and knowledgeable way in identifying and exploring
alternatives."'' " Doctrinally, then, the concept of care encompasses much
"Id. at 48.
"Many decisions contend that the exercise of due care is a predicate to the business
judgment rule. A New York decision states that "[w]hen courts say that they will not interfere in
matters ofbusiness judgment, it is presupposed thatjudgment-reasonable diligence -has in fact
been exercised... [that] an honest, unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them." Casey
v. Woodruff 49 N.Y.S.2d 625,643 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944). An even clearer statement is that "the
business judgment rule protects directors from liability for good faith errors only after the directors
have exercised reasonable care in fulfilling their corporate obligations." Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (D. Utah 1993) (applying Utah law). These statements indicate that
'judgment" in the phrase "business judgment" means more than the discrete formal utterance of a
decision; it is the process - to be engaged in with care - of forming an opinion by evaluating
information. See generally Johnson, supra note 46 (critiquing Delaware's formulation and use of
the business judgment rule).
"Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1125 (Del. Ch. 1990).
'567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
"aId at 1286; see Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292 (Del. 1998)
(stating that "the exact course of conduct that must be charted to properly discharge that
responsibility will change in the specific context of the action the director is taking").
1"Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1287 (emphasis added).
159d.
"Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989).
Interestingly, Citron is the case that, rhetorically at least, equated the informedness element of
Aronson's business judgment rule with due care.
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more than informedness. A fully-articulated duty of due care would seal this
issue in Delaware law.
b. Care Outside Business Judgment Setting
A second benefit of expressly verbalizing a broader duty of due care
is that the duty applies outside the business judgment setting and, outside
that setting, the duty is usefully seen as broader than mere informedness.
Justice Horseytraces the emergence of care in Delaware law and finds the
Delaware Supreme Court acknowledging such a duty in dictum in 1963:1
"[I]t appears that directors of a corporation in managing the coiporate affairs
are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent
men would use in similar circumstances.""16 Two years earlier in a case not
involving business judgment, the chancellor held corporate directors liable
for losses proximately caused by their failure to discharge supervisory
responsibilities related to violations of corporate investment policy. 63
Liability resulted only because directors had breached a legal duty to
perform with a certain level of care, what the chancellor called "a reasonable
16'Horsey, supra note 34, at 985.
"IL at 986 (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125,130 (Del. 1963)).
TheAllis-Chalmers dictum appears to be the chief basis for believing that the Delaware Supreme
Court recognizes a director duty of care. See, e.g., Horsey, supra note 34, at 986-87; R. FRANKIN
BALoTr & JEssE A. FiNKEISTEiN, TH DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATONS AN BusimEss
ORGANZATIONS § 4.34, at 4-216 (1998); see also Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d
963, 972 (Del. Ch. 1986) (finding that, outside the business judgment setting, care required is that
of an ordinarily carefil and prudent person); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188, 192-93 (Del. Ch.
1971) (recognizing, in dictum, negligence as basis for director liability).
Cede Ildescribes theAllis-Chalmers care formulation as "quite confusing and unhelpfid,"
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364 n.31 (Del. 1993), a peculiar description to
apply to such a longstanding and widespread formulation. See Richard B. Dyson, The Director's
Liabilityfor Negligence, 40 Im. L. 341, 371 (1965) (stating that a vast majority ofjurisdictions
require ordinary care). If anything, Delaware's "gross negligence" formulation is confusing and
unhelpful, as Samuel Arsht pointed out twenty years ago. Arsht, supra note 97, at 120-21 n. 119.
Chief Justice Veasey long ago made a similar point in stating that little attempt is made to define
gross negligence. Veasey & Manning, supra note 135, at 928. Moreover, the Cede 11 critique of
Allis-Chalmers is misleading because, althoughAllis-Chalmers does, in part, later speak of director
liability in terms of"reckless" conduct, it also clearly states that liability will result if a director
"neglected" to perform her duty or ignored it"through inattention [to] obvious danger signs." Allis-
Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 130. Neglect and inattention can easily be understood as simple negligence.
Chancellor Allen critically discussed the Allis-Chalmers decision in In re Caremarklnt'l
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969-71 (Del. Ch. 1996). Chancellor Allen offers possible
broad and narrow readings ofAllis-Chalmers, concluding that an overly broad reading - i.e., that
directors need not establish an appropriate information and reporting system - would not be
accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1996. Id. at 969-70.
"Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 396 (Del. Ch. 1961).
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
discharge of their duties."'" This duty of care applied even though the
directors had not exercised business judgment. Notwithstanding Cede Hand
Cede M, this reveals both that due care in Delaware encompasses more than
informedness and that due care is rightly seen as a duty comprising more
than a "component" of the business judgment rule. This point would not
have to be methodically excavated from various cases - and would not
disappear so readily - were the Delaware Supreme Court to articulate the
duty more fully and forthrightly.
Another court of chancery case where the business judgment rule was
unavailable (because directors did not exercise a considered business
judgment on certain transactions) also found for the plaintiff-shareholder,
thereby necessarily ruling that directors had violated a duty to act with care
in a way that extended beyond the business judgment rule setting. 65 Even
within the business judgment context, the court of chancery has made clear
that directors could breach their duties in ways other than by fraud or self-
dealing; directors could "breach that duty by being grossly negligent."166
This nameless duty in Penn Mart Realty to avoid acting with gross
negligence is, like the unnamed duty in Kaplan, none other than the
requirement later articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson that
directors must act with "requisite care."167 The key point is not whether the
level of culpability associated with "requisite care" is gross negligence or
ordinary negligence. The point here is the much more basic one of
demonstrating that Delaware recognizes a pervasive (if ill-defined) duty of
care both in and outside the business judgment setting, whether or not it
consistently designates that duty as care. Were this duty of due care made
1"Id. at 395. Although the chancellor described the directors' conduct as "grossly
negligent," it does not mean the legal standard that was applied (as opposed to the actual low level
of director conduct therein described) was gross negligence rather than simple negligence. See
Veasey & Manning, supra note 135, at 928 (tersely describing Lutz as applying a gross negligence
standard because of the chancellor's phrasing). Indeed, the chancellor's reference to "reasonable
discharge" of duties, his assertion that "even an average attention to duty" would have revealed
wrongdoing, his statement that had directors "discharged their responsibilities as to general
supervision" violations would have been discovered, and his description, twice, ofdirectorbehavior
as "negligence," support the view that ordinary negligence was the legal standard applied in Lutz.
See Rabkin, 547 A.2d at 972. See also S. Samuel Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directors,
Officers and Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 652, 659 (1979) (arguing that Allis-Chalmers
establishes a negligence standard). Chief Justice Veasey since has indicated his view that the
Delaware Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether negligence or gross negligence is the proper
standard in the oversight context, as opposed to the business judgment context. E. Norman Veasey,
Directors and the Dynamics of Delaware Corporation Law, 21 DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY 3 (Nov.
1997).
'"Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
'"Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972).
"Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The court stated that, in that case,
gross negligence was the standard by which "requisite care" was to be measured. Id.
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more prominent, and its contours elucidated more fully, it would not fall so
frequently from judicial view.
C. Entire Fairness Not Feasible in All Care Cases
Third, the Cede standard of entire fairness, said to be triggered by a
breach of care, is meaningless in duty of care cases that do not involve
discrete transactions. It is therefore not a generalizable or uniform review
standard that can be applied in all breach of due care cases. Care cases in
non-transactional settings such as, for example, uninformed or otherwise
careless decisions on corporate distributions, or decisions to expand or
contract a business (other than through purchase or divestiture of an entire
corporation) cannot be fitted into an entire fairness framework because they
do not involve discrete market-based events lending themselves to a
"fairness" analysis. 6 Moreover, cases involving director failure to.monitor
also are non-transactional - indeed, they may not even involve business
judgments - and thus likewise do not fit into a "fair dealing" and "fair
price" matrix, because no specific "deal" at a particular price has been made.
Yet, as the recent Caremark case teaches, faulty monitoring cases clearly
implicate a director's duty of care.
69
Even within the business judgment transactional setting, a fairness
analysis makes no sense when the challenged director behavior was that no
deal was done (unless the court chooses to evaluate the "entire fairness" of
the status quo as compared to a spurned transaction), unlike the Cede
litigation where a board-endorsed deal thought by shareholders to be inferior
to a better alternative could bejudicially assessed for entire fairness. If Cede
Hland Cede 1H articulate an analytical framework useful for analyzing care
claims only when one, rather than another, transaction is done - or, more
generally, only where a transaction of any sort is done - it addresses only
a special category of care and does not, as it purports, articulate a uniformly
applicable method for generally reviewing director due care claims.
d. Cede Fair Dealing Factors as Disguised Entire Care Factors
Fourth, an explicit and enriched duty of care more forthrightly injects
into judicial analysis, at an earlier stage, those factors the Cede I1 court
"'lhis is also the problem with applying the entire fairness standard when directors fail to
carry their initial two-pronged burden under Unocal. See infra note 213. This test originated in a
context where a specific, self-dealing business transaction could be assessed for fairness.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
"In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). For a
fuller discussion of the Caremark decision, see infra text accompanying notes 221-26.
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eventually considered under its entire fairness standard as bearing on "fair
dealing."'70 Having found a director duty of care breach because the board's
failure to make a market check resulted in a finding of uninformedness,1
7
1
the Cede Illcourt subsequently assessed a host of factors that the board had
done properly, and concluded the board had, nonetheless, engaged in fair
dealing.
172
This analysis could and should have been done as part of the threshold
duty of care analysis. The inquiry would have been whether under "the
circumstances of [this] particular case,"'" "considered in light of the whole
case,"'74 the directors, in considering that same host of factors in the context
of "the entire situation,"'175 had fulfilled their duty of due care - or entire
care. Instead, the court sheepishly recognized the care nature of the factors
it was smuggling into its fairness test and made the peculiar statement that
"[t]he degree of procedural due care a board of directors exercises has been
recognized as a continuing component of an entire fairness analysis."'
176
This strange outcome stems from the court's basic error in treating the
plaintiffs rebuttal of prevailing formulations of the Delaware business
judgment rule as itself proving a due care breach, rather than bearing only
one facet of care, insufficient informedness. The informedness issue itself
should have been addressed in the larger context of the other care-like
factors later considered under the "fair dealing" analysis. Although the
defendants would have the burden to produce evidence on this issue, the
plaintiff should have continued to bear the burden of persuasion that the
directors failed to act with overall or "entire" care. The plaintiff would fail
to meet this burden because the directors could cite, in defense of their due
care position, the very factors eventually found by the court to support a
finding of fair dealing. The result in Cede is that the directors ultimately
were found to have acted fairly, but not (initially, at least) carefully, although
due care was said to be a "component" of fairness. 177 Fulfilling a higher
review standard after failing a lower one could happen only if, first, fairness
review is disguised (re-visited) care review or, second, there is, within the
ambit of entire fairness review, an odd "balancing" of the breach of duty of
'7°Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156, 1172 (Del. 1995).
171 d. at 1172-73.
172d. at 1175, 1178.
"Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,42 n.13 (Del.
1993).
"Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974).
7"'QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 44.
..6Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156, 1175 (Del. 1995).
177Id.
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care against the proper discharge of other fiduciary duties (i.e. loyalty).'
Each possibility serves to obscure rather than honor the distinctive nature
and purpose of those two duties.
3. Undermining Distinctive Policy Rationales for Care and Loyalty
By applying the same standard of review to care and loyalty claims
and by somehow "balancing" breaches of one duty against fulfillment of the
other under a unitary "entire fairness" test, Cede blurs the two duties and
betrays the historical policy reasons for judicial deference in care cases and
judicial scrutiny in loyalty cases. Recent decisional law in Delaware
explains the rationales for divergent review standards in care and loyalty
cases.
Chancellor Allen describes the judicial deference accorded director
decision making through the business judgment rule - where no self-
dealing or improper motive exists - as "protection against a threat of sub-
optimal risk acceptance." '179 By this, Chancellor Allen relates that
shareholders in public corporations, because they can manage risk by
diversifying their portfolio of investments, do not want directors of any
particular corporation to be unduly risk averse." ° A director - who may
receive little of the financial payoff from undertaking a risky project - will
be more risk averse than shareholders rationally desire if a director faces
personal liability for the substantial losses that may result from a business
decision regarded, retrospectively, as substantively foolish or simply
unreasonable. To more closely align director attitudes toward risk with
"In Cede III, the court stated that the entire fairness analysis requires a "balancing" of the
duties breachedvis-A-vis the manner in which other duties were "properly discharged." Cinerama,
Inc., 663 A.2d at 1165. The court also indicated that those aspects of board conduct "properly
discharged" were to be "weighed... against" board failure. Id. at 1179. This is tantamount to
saying, with respect to two virtues (e.g., honesty and courtesy), that failing in the one can somehow
be compensated for by especial fulfillment of the other. This analysis not only negates the
"independentsignificance" (Cede& Co.v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d345,367 (Del. 1993)) oftwo
virtues (whether legal or moral), it also suggests that various amalgams of breach of one specific
duty and discharge of another specific duty yield some overall fulfillment of a general duty. If an
extra portion of one legal duty can, partially at least, substitute for deficiency of another, one
wonders why, conversely, in the loyalty setting, an especially carefuldirectorwould notbe allowed
a measure of disloyally. Perhaps that is what Delaware courts are close to endorsing. See supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
'79Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
' dla,
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shareholder preferences, the business judgment rule is designed to accord
directors substantial latitude in their business decision making."'
The business judgment rule - and the judicial deference it provides
is also grounded on a policy to encourage capable persons to serve as
directors by reducing their risk exposure, to limit litigation over corporate
decision making, and, importantly, to avoid intrusiveness by public officials
(judges) into private sector business affairs.'82 The key assumption here,
however, is that the directors making decisions are disinterested and
independent.18
Where director self-interest is present, and the self-interest affects a
majority of directors approving a transaction, the focus of concern becomes
director loyalty, not merely competence. Concerned about director fidelity
to the corporation's interests, judges will apply exacting scrutiny to
determine for themselves whether a transaction is entirely fair (including
substantively fair) to shareholders. 1" The reason for abandoning the
deference of the business judgment standard and adopting such an invasive
test is that, there being no other independent decision maker within the
corporation, the court necessarily becomes, on behalf of the shareholders, the
only available "neutral decision-making body" passing judgment on the
matter.'85
The key policy question where directors carefulness has been
challenged is whether, upon concluding that directors have breached the
duty of care (whether Cede's informedness or this article's broader entire care
notion), the usual policy rationales for deference necessarily should fall away
andthe rationales favoring judicial scrutiny of the substantive merits of a
811d. at 1052-53. Importantly, the rationale for deference depends, first, on the board
exercising its statutory responsibilities for management of the business and affairs of the
corporation, and second, that the challenged director action be a business judgment, not, for
example, a legal judgment concerning whether shareholders have been given all material information
to which they are entitled under Delaware's director-disclosure obligations. This is why director
conduct in duty of disclosure cases is notreviewed under a business judgment standard even though
loyalty or good faith may not be implicated. See, e.g., In re Anderson, Clayton Shareholders Litig.,
519A.2d 669,675 (Del. Ch. 1986). Thekeyrationalefordeferene-businessjudgment- isnot
present, even though disloyalty orbad faith also may notbe present. This demonstrates the need for
one or more judicial review standards for director conduct where both business judgment review and
the fairness review triggered by disloyalty are inappropriate.
S Iarvey Goldschmid, The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule, SC53 ALI-ABA
1, 5 (1997); see Joy v.North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983);
A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986). See also
Riley, supra note 98, at 709-12 (describing rationales for deference).
113Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1053.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 21-25; Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1993).
"'Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156, 1170 & n.25 (Del. 1995).
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decision are thereby triggered, resulting in loyalty-like entire fairness review.
Beginning with the customary rationales for judicial deference in the
business judgment setting,186 disinterested directors who must prove the
entire fairness of transactions or face potential personal liability if they were
not adequately informed, may reduce risk either by making very certain they
are fully informed (perhaps acting with an excess of counter-productive,
costly and time-consuming caution) or by concluding that not doing a deal
(any deal) is always a safer route than doing one and risking an expensive
judicial finding ofunfaimess.1 7 The latter outcome surely does not advance
shareholder interests and the former may or may not, depending on whether
director zeal to avoid' the entire fairness test leads to a bias toward
inefficient, deal-clogging behavior out of an overabundance of caution.
From a shareholder risk preference standpoint, requiring directors to
demonstrate the substantive merits of a business decision to a court's
exacting satisfaction or face personal liability, should not turn only on
director error in becoming informed any more than on any other director
error in business judgment, assuming actual judgment on the matter of
informedness was exercised. Shareholders would seem to have the same
tolerance for according latitude to director judgment in the one area as well
as in the other, lest directors take risk-averse courses of action in either
undertaking. Director liability on this shareholder risk preference rationale
should turn on the overall unreasonableness of the director decision-making
process, not just a single component (be it informedness or any other),
because it is only such an overall sound decision-making process that
shareholders should, ex ante, rationally desire.
An exclusive focus on informedness alone (or on any other single
element of care), even as a sort of crude proxy for due care, almost inevitably
invites expost claims that directors were not "informed enough." This one-
sided scrutiny is reminiscent, in reverse, ofthe pre-Administrative Procedure
Act substantial evidence test, whereby an agency finding was upheld if a
court could "find something in the evidence that support[ed] it. 188 Focusing
on informedness without regard to the larger decision-making context
means, likewise, that plaintiff wins on the care issue by attacking
'6See supra text accompanying notes 179-82. See generally Johnson, supra note 46
(critiquing Delaware's formulation and use of the business judgment rule).
I'his pointbuilds on the earlier critique of applying an entire fairness standard in the care
area as unhelpful, where no transaction at all was undertaken, as opposed to where one rather than
another transaction was undertaken. See supra Part IV.C.2.c. This bias is possible because a
decision to maintain the status quo is evaluated more mildly in corporate law than a decision to
change course.
ILouis L. Jaffe, JudicialReview. "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HARv.
L. REV. 1233, 1236 (1951) (quoting Justice Frankfurter) (emphasis added).
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informedness alone, without regard to how the "whole record" bears on the
soundness of the decision-making process. Instead, shareholders should
always have the burden to demonstrate the unreasonableness of director
behavior in the overall decision-making process. Judicial insistence on an
overall sound decision-making process, therefore, "need not quell director
initiative" '89 in a way contrary to shareholder risk preferences.
Moreover, because shareholders rightly expect a reasonable decision-
making process from their elected representatives, if shareholders prove its
absence, then the directors should be liable for all damages proximately
caused thereby. The judiciary's views on the substantive merits of the
decision are fortuitous at this juncture; a breach of due care is not somehow
negated or undone by a business decision's quality. If, however, directors
believe, and can demonstrate, that their careless conduct did not cause
shareholders any damage because, for example, a transaction was
qualitatively "fair," the plaintiff will be unable to prove damages flowing
from the directors' faulty decision-making process. The result is a breach of
care but no damages caused thereby; therefore, no director liability will
ensue. Additionally, if the spectre of liability for care breaches is thought to
dampen director initiative in a suboptimal fashion, shareholders might agree
ex ante to exculpate directors from monetary damages for care breaches, 9°
agreeing to seek only equitable relief.
This approach honors another key care rationale forjudicial deference
better than Cede, that of the perceived institutional incompetence of public
officials to evaluate the substantive quality of private sector business
decisions. 1 The absence of informedness alone - or even an affirmative
showing of unreasonableness in the overall decision-making process - does
not warrant a court to supplant a board of directors and pass its own
judgment - usually long after the fact - on the substantive merits of a
business decision." Care cases, unlike loyalty cases, do not deprive
"'Cohn, supra note 98, at 606.
"'Section 102(b)(7) of Delaware's General Corporation Law allows the certificate of
incorporation to limit or eliminate the personal liability of directors for breaches of duty other than
the duty of loyalty. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1998). Equitable relief would still be
available, even with such a provision. Moreover, some breaches thought of as care breaches in the
"with care" meaning ofthat word, see supra Part IV.C.1, might be characterized as loyalty breaches
in the "care for" sense, and thereby not fall under § 102(b)(7). See supra Part IV.C.1. An example
is director abdication. Supra note 125. Conversely, defendants seeking exculpation will
characterize breaches as broadly raising a "care" duty, thereby coming within the statutory
exculpation. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Live Entertainment, Inc., No. 15,765, slip op. at 10-11 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 22, 1999), reprinted in 24 DEL. J. COPi. L. 1084, 1101 (1999).
'See supra text accompanying note 182.
"'Two matters are troublesome in this regard. First, the corporation statute (§ 141(a))
places the business and affairs of a corporation under the direction of a board of directors, not a
court. See Quicktura Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998). Failure of
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corporations of "neutral decision-makers.""lre The prevailing loyalty rationale
for judicial assessment of substantive fairness of business decisions,
therefore, does not apply in care cases, even where care is breached.
Consequently, a care breach, contrary to what Cede II and Cede III hold,
should not result in judicial review of substance. At the same time, a care
breach should have more than Cede's burden-shifting procedural effect; it
should have substantive force. In a meaningful sense, the substantive force
of the business judgment rule always applies in a care case, immunizing the
quality of the decision from judicial review whether or not care was
exercised.1" In the care setting, the proper inquiry is whether an
undoubtedly neutral decision-maker acted in the proper manner; that inquiry
does not ever necessitate or warrant judicial inquiry into the substantive
merits of a decision," only into the process by which it was made. Whether
the decision-making process was sound or unsound, the court is not to pass
judgment as such on the substantive merits of the business decision.
If the directors' decision-making process was sound, the court looks
at the business decision itself only to verify a linkage between process and
outcome. Importantly, the inquiry is not an examination of substance -
even for minimal rationality - but only an analysis of whether the decision
a board to act with care in discharging this statutory responsibility neither transfers this
responsibility to the judiciary nor is the failure negated by ajudicial conclusion that the ultimate
outcome was, after all, "fair." Second, although the duty of care mandates that directors act only
"with care" (whether understood as informedness or as a richer entire care notion), after Cede, a
director found to have breached that duty is saddled with the furtherunexpected duty ofproving that
what was done is "entirely fair." The expostjudicial review standard of fairness, therefore, is more
demanding than the ex ante duty to act with care. A director acting in good faith and having no
disqualifying self-interest in a matter may rightly believe his or her only remaining duty is to act
carefully. Yet Cede tells a directorthat upon ajudicial finding ofbreach of care, having acted fairly
will atone for the breach, possibly leading some directors to believe, out of caution, that the ex ante
duty ofcare is best regarded as including a fallback duty to act fairly. The judicial review standard,
therefore, indirectly may alter the director standard of conduct.
"'See supra text accompanying note 185.
" rTe view expressed in the text goes farther than Chancellor Allen's proper view that the
substance ofbusiness decisions are no concern of the court where process is sound. In re Caremark
Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996). That is true, but whether or not
process is sound, the quality of a business decision is not properly an issue for the judiciary in the
care area. See Johnson, supra note 46 for an elaboration of this point.
"'hus, even the mild substantive review found in the "rational business purpose" element
ofordinary business judgmentrule reviewshouldbe eliminated. See supra text accompanying note
20. Moreover, the Sinclair court itself confusingly articulated both a "rational" and a somewhat
stricter "reasonable" business purpose standard. Whether the court meant the same thing by these
terms is unclear. In this context, however, neither should apply. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720-21 (Del. 1971). The duty of good faith remains, however, and a business decision
may be so substantivelyegregious that an inference of bad faith is permissible. See, e.g., Pames v.
Bally Entertainment Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246-47 (Del. 1999); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
Shareholders Litig., No. 10,389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *41 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); In
re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-68.
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actually made was a "rational outcome of' the decision-making process
actually undertaken. Put another way, the court asks whether there is a
"rational connection between" the actual sound process and the decision
actually reached."9 If, on the other hand, the process is defective, directors
will be liable without regard to decisional quality (on the rationale that
judicial views of decisional quality are irrelevant in the care area) for all
damages proximately caused by their carelessness, excepting only rescissory
damages.1" Again, to reduce liability exposure, directors can seek ex ante
shareholder exculpation from damages or, notwithstanding a proven breach
of care, they can defend against an award of damages or equitable relief by
extolling the "fair" economic merits of their decision as negating the
existence of harm from their breach.
The Cede burden shift and entire fairness approach to duty of care
breaches, therefore, not only finds no doctrinal support,198 it also cavalierly
negates longstanding rationales for divergent standards ofjudicial review in
the care and loyalty areas. These rationales are better honored, and due care
in Delaware would be upgraded as Justice Horsey sought1  not by using a
strict scrutiny standard coupled with a burden shift, but by fortifying
explicitly the concept of due care. An enriched and pervasive concept of
entire care would bring to Delaware law the larger coherence rightly sought
by Cede, while still respecting the sound doctrine and policy long-embedded
(if not always openly stated) in Delaware decisions.
V. ENTIRE CARE - A PROPOSAL
The Delaware Supreme Court should declare that directors of
Delaware corporations owe a duty of entire due care to their corporations at
all times and in all settings. The duty is to act with the care an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position
under similar circumstances. This duty requires not only that directors make
business judgments with care, but also that they discharge all other functions
with care,2'e including oversight and monitoring of corporate affairs. In the
' The "rational connection" expression is an administrative law notion, requiring that an
agency offer a linkage ("rational connection") between its findings and its decision. Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
" Chancellor Allen has forcefully argued against awarding rescissory damages in a duty
of care case. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1144-50 (Del. Ch. 1994), affd,
663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
198See supra text accompanying notes 77-90.
"1Horsey, supra note 34, at 998.
"°Professor Goldschmid describes a director's functions as "the corporate tasks to be
performed." Goldschmid, supra note 182, at 2. He goes on to state that these functions may be "(a)
prescribed by the corporation law of a state (e.g., declaration of dividends); (b) inherent in an office
[Vol. 24
RETHINKING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DIRECTOR CARE
special context of making a business judgment, entire due care means that
directors must use a reasonable decision-making process leading up to the
business decision. This means that directors must obtain all reasonably
available material information, analyze it, deliberate on it, and otherwise act
with entire care under the circumstances. Directors are presumed to have
acted with entire due care both when making business judgments and at all
other times, meaning simply that in all care claims the plaintiff carries the
burden of proving a director failed to act in the required manner. In the
special context of a business judgment care case, because of the undoubted
importance of director informedness °1 if the plaintiff produces evidence at
the outset that the directors acted in an uninformed manner - such
evidence-production being, at this stage, a milder requirement than proving
lack of informedness - the defendants then have the burden of producing
evidence on the overall reasonableness of their decision-making process.
The burden of persuasion on that ultimate issue, however, remains
throughout on the plaintiff.
The substantive quality of any action whether taken or not-whether
described as "rational," "reasonable," or "fair" - is not an issue in a care
case because only the manner of conduct is at issue.2 This is true not only
when the plaintiff fails to overcome the presumption of due care by failing
to carry the assigned burden of proof, but also when the plaintiff succeeds
in carrying the burden of proving a breach of due care. The overall decision-
making process that is actually undertaken, however, once determined to
have been reasonable, must supply a rational basis for (that is, a "rational
connection" to) the actual decision. In other words, sound process cannot be
followed by a decision not rationally linked to, or a rational outcome of, the
.. ; (c) imposed by special legislative provisions (often found in statutes regulating financial
institutions); or (d) imposedby the corporation itself(e.g., in certificate provisions, by-laws, or other
standards of the corporation)." Id.
"°As statedby the Delaware Supreme Court: 'TIhe need for adequate information is central
to the enlightened evaluation.., that aboardimustmake." Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d
1279, 1287 (Del. 1989).
'0 'ProfessorBransonhas stated: "In the corporate law duty ofcare cases, the central inquiry
always has been process rather than result." Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the
Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 97, 97 (1989).
Virginia!s statutory standard of conduct for corporate directors, for example, contains no
requirement that a director act "reasonably" or in any other specified substantive fashion. Rather,
a director is required only to act "in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best
interests of the corporation." VA. CODn ANN. § 13.1-690 (Michie 1998). This statute has been
interpreted as prohibiting judicial inquiry into the substance of director decisions and allowing only
inquiry into the manner in which directors discharged their duties. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson
Foods, Inc. 65 F.3d 1172, 1184-85 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1117 (1996). For an
extended discussion of Virginia!s statute, see Lyman Johnson, MisunderstandingDirector Duties:
The Strange Case of Virginia, 56 WASH. &LEE L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).
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actual decision-making process. This mild requirement avoids the unlikely,
but theoretically possible, complete disjunction between process and
outcome. Judicial review here is not a judicial assessment of the decision's
substantive merits as such, but rather it remains a process-oriented inquiry
into whether the decision actually arrived at could plausibly flow from the
process actually undertaken. Although subtle, the difference in judicial
function argued for in this Article is critical to maintaining a proper division
of managerial and judicial responsibility.
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the directors failed to act with
requisite care - whether in a business judgment or other care case - the
defendants are liable for all damages proximately caused by that breach of
duty, except rescissory damages. Damages may be nonexistent or limited if,
among other possibilities, the substantive quality of the challenged decision
is sufficiently good, as it turns out, that little or no harm was caused by
director carelessness.
In addition to the benefits of a general duty of due care cited earlier, °"
there are several advantages to this particular proposal. First, it supplies to
Delawarejurisprudence what has long been missing- an express, generally
applicable duty of entire due care, applying to, but not subsumed as a
component of the business judgment rule, and a duty not expressed as
merely requiring director informedness. Second, the proposed formulation
of the entire due care duty is succinct but complete. It closely tracks the
1963 Allis-Chalmers dictum that first recognized such a duty.2°4 It is
somewhat similar to prevailing formulations summarized by Samuel Arsht
twenty years ago, 05 and it is more compact than the standards appearing in
either The Model Business Corporation Act"s or The American Law
'"See supra Parts IV.C.2. to 3.
'he Delaware Supreme Court stated that "directors ... are bound to use that amount of
care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances." Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). See Cohn, supra note 98, at 602-05
(expressing director duty of care as a prudent and reasonable person standard). The proposal in this
Article expresses the duty in gender-neutral language and adds a "reasonably be expected to
exercise" and a "like position" qualifier. The last two phrases - "like position" and "similar
circumstances" - appear in both The Model Business Corporation Act standard of conduct for
directors and the director duty of care found in The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance. See infra notes 206-07. They capture the idea that the care required of a director is
that appropriate for the particular corporation in the actual circumstances at hand. The language
"reasonably be expected to exercise" is found in The American Law Institute formulation only. See
infra note 207. This phrase is only designed to provide leeway in the manner by which directors
discharge duties (whether business judgment or otherwise) and is not a substantive standard by
which actual considered director decisions are to be judicially assessed.
...See Arsht, supra note 97, at 97-100, 120-21; Cohn, supra note 98, at 602-05.
'Mae Model Business Corporation Act codifies the standard of conduct for directors, in
part, as follows:
§ 8.30 General Standards for Directors
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Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 7 deleting the latter two
codifications' unhelpful element that a director "reasonably believe" that he
or she is acting in a manner best for the corporation. 8 The proposal does
not separately express an obligation of director informedness.
Third, the proposal rejects the Cede II and Cede III application of
entire fairness review to care breaches as unsound on both doctrinal and
policy grounds. At the same time, it more directly achieves the Delaware
Supreme Court's goal of bolstering the role of care in Delaware corporate
law. This standard, moreover, is pervasive, meaning it applies within the
business judgment context and at all other times.2' Furthermore, the
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as
a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in alike position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a mannerhe reasonably believes to be in the best interests ofthe
corporation ....
MODELBUs.CORP.ACT§ 8.30(1997). Thirty-six states have adopted similar statutes. Section8.30
ofThe Model Business Corporation Act was amended in 1998. See Committee on Corporate Laws,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act - Amendments Pertaining to Electronic
Filings/Standards of Conduct and Standards ofLiabilityfor Directors, 53 Bus. LAw. 157 (1997).
'The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance codify the duty of care,
in part, as follows:
§ 4.01 Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the Business Judgment Rule
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's
or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and
under similar circumstances. This Subsection (a) is subject to the provisions of
Subsection (c) (the business judgment rule) where applicable.
(1) The duty in Subsection (a) includes the obligation to make, or cause to be
made, an inquiry when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable
director or officer to the need therefor. The extent of such inquiry shall be such
as the director or officer reasonably believes to be necessary.
(2) In performing any of his or her functions (including over-sight functions),
a director or officer is entitled to rely on materials and persons in accordance with
§§ 4.02 and 4.03 (reliance on directors, officers, employees, experts, other
persons, and committees of the board) ....
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (1997).
'New York's corporation statute also deletes that element from its codification of a
director's duty. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1997). See supra note 202 (describing
Virginia's statute).
'"In an important 1998 opinion on the directors' disclosure obligation, the Delaware
Supreme Court described the constant, rather than intermittent, nature of director duties: "The
shareholder constituents of a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon their elected directors
to discharge their fiduciary duties at all times." Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); see
Quicktum Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292 (Del. 1998) (describing director
fiduciary duty as an "unremitting obligation").
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proposal's standard is not one of gross negligence, but that of the care
reasonably to be expected of an ordinarily prudent person. The standard of
conduct therefore is upgraded straightforwardly, unlike Cede's
unprecedented fairness standard of review where exacting judicial scrutiny
of the substantive soundness of business decisions is coupled with a burden
of proof shift to defendants. Nor is the proposed concept of entire due care
limited to the frail requirement of director informedness, or, more accurately,
to the condition that directors not behave with gross negligence in becoming
informed. Instead, the proposal demands that directors act with reasonable
prudence throughout the discharge of all their duties (rather than simply
avoid gross negligence). Through both adjudication and the advance advice
of legal counsel, this should pervasively raise the standard of director
performance outside of, as well as within, the business judgment context.
Fourth, although some confusion exists on the point, the proposal's
standard of reasonable conduct is rightly lower than a fairness inquiry,21° but
suitably higher - on process grounds - than the prevailing business
judgment formulation of informedness plus judicial scrutiny of a decision's
substantive quality under a rationality standard. This achieves the analytical
coherence sought by Cede, but on a sounder basis for care claims. Not only
is the quality of a business decision not examined under a demanding
fairness standard, but the quality of the decision in a care claim is not
judicially examined at all. The inquiry is not into the decision itself, but is,
instead, entirely an examination of the manner of the decision-maker's
conduct in making the decision. That manner of conduct, however, must be
more than the avoidance of gross negligence; it must conform throughout to
the care of ordinary, reasonable prudence. This proposal takes judicial
review of board process quite seriously, not shoring it up ex post by
engaging in judicial scrutiny of substance. The proposal therefore also
avoids another problem with the Cede application of entire fairness review
to care claims, a problem common to high-sanction regimes: a greater
(possibly unspoken) inclination not to find the existence of the event
...Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg states that, under Delaware law, if the business
judgment rule does not apply, "the standard of review is based on entire fairness or reasonability."
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Director's Duty of Care in Negotiated Dispositions, 51 U. MIAML .
REV. 579, 583 (1997). If Professor Eisenberg is distinguishing fairness and reasonableness from
business judgment review, he is correct; if he is equating the two notions of "fairness" and
"reasonableness," he misdescribes them underDelaware law. See Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,42 & n.9 (Del. 1993); Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A
Primer on the Basics of Directors'Duties in Delaware: The Rules of the Game (Part II), 42 VILL.
L. REV. 1043, 1052 (1997) (distinguishing entire fairness and reasonableness review). See also
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1378-79 (Del. 1993) (stating, carelessly, that the court
searchingly examines the "reasonableness" of a decision under the "entire fairness" review standard).
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triggering the sanction because of concern over the severe consequences
thereby set in motion.
Finally, in several special situations arising in recent years, use of a
"reasonableness" standard of review, intermediate between the quite
deferential business judgment rule standard and the quite exacting entire
fairness standard, finds growing support in Delaware law. Recognition by
the Delaware Supreme Court of the value of a reasonable prudence standard
in special contexts paves the way for introducing a more general reasonable
prudence standard into the due care area.
The Delaware Supreme Court recognizes that there are "rare
situations" where "a court subjects the directors' conduct to enhanced
scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable."2"' Best known of these situations is
director adoption of defensive measures in response to a threat to corporate
control.212 In Unocal, the court held that before the traditional business
judgment rule was applied to evaluate director conduct, the directors had an
initial two-part burden to demonstrate, first, that directors had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed and, second, that the defensive measure was reasonable in relation
to the threat posed.213 In this setting, the Delaware Supreme Court avoids
the powerful deference of ordinary business judgment rule review, while not
engaging inappropriately in a fairness review reserved for loyalty claims.
Rather, the court staked out an intermediate review standard of
reasonableness.
A second setting where the Delaware Supreme Court has applied an
enhanced "reasonableness" review standard is in the sale or change of
control context. There, the court summarized its holdings as requiring a
board of directors to fulfill its "obligation of acting reasonably to seek the
21QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 42.
2' Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-56 (Del. 1985).
'"Id See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 & n.13 (Del. 1995).
The Unitrin court separately stated that if directors fail to carry their burden that the defensive
measure adopted was reasonable, then entire fairness review is applied to the defensive measure.
Id at 1377 n. 18. Unless the supreme court is implying that loyalty is implicated whenever a Unocal
analysis is triggered - a position inconsistent with Unocal itself where the duty to protect the
corporate enterprise is described as a "duty of care"- fairness review should not automatically be
undertaken upon director failure to carry the initial Unocal burden. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
Rather, unless a particular failure is characterized as a loyalty breach, the effect of director failure
to carry the special Unocal burden because of care concerns ought to be that the larger burden of
proving entire due care thereby shifts to defendants. See, e.g., A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114-15 (Del. Ch. 1986). Conversely, if directors do carry theirtwo-
part Unocal burden, the determination that their conduct was "reasonable" would seem necessarily
to carry with it a determination that the plaintiffs could not, at least on care grounds, demonstrate
noncompliance with the business judgment rule standard of review. As a result, upon the directors
carrying their Unocal burden, the case is over as far as the duty of care is concerned.
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transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders. '21 4 The higher board obligation, the court held, also required
enhanced judicial scrutiny. The features of an enhanced scrutiny test are:
(a) judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the
decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including
the information on which the directors based their decision;
and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the
directors' action in light of the circumstances then existing.
The directors have the burden of proving that they were
adequately informed and acted reasonably.
215
The Delaware Supreme Court clearly articulated an intermediate
"reasonableness" standard of review, which it expressly distinguished from
entire fairness review.2" 6 Moreover, the court's first requirement under its
special two-part enhanced scrutiny test for change of control settings is,
essentially, what this article calls "entire due care" and advocates for general
application in the business judgment context. The difference in the special
sale of control context is that the burden of proving the adequacy of the
decision-making process (wrongly reduced by the Delaware Supreme Court
in the last quoted sentence to the informedness element) lies with the
directors. In the ordinary care case, this article places that burden on the
plaintiff.
The court in QVC, under the second part of its enhanced scrutiny test,
judicially reviews "the reasonableness of the substantive merits of a board's
actions. "M Although arguably the court should not be reviewing the
substance of the board decision itself, even in a sale of control setting,28 at
least the court applied a "reasonableness" test to this undertaking, not the
stricter "entire fairness" test used in Cede H and Cede II. By a parity of
reasoning, at the very least, the Cede opinions should have held that, upon
proof of a duty of care breach, the substantive "reasonableness" (not
"fairness") of the board decision would be examined. This is a standard of
review by which "courts will not substitute their business judgment for that
of the directors, but will determine if the directors' decision was, on balance,
214QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 43 (emphasis added).
"'Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
2161d. at 42 & n.9.
271d. at 45.
2"See supra text accompanying notes 191-96, 213. See also B. Ellen Taylor, New and
Unjustified Restrictions on Delaware Directors'Authority, 21 DEL. J. CoRnl. L. 837, 883, 891-94
(1996) (stating that in a sale of control context, the court should not substitute its judgment for that
of the board's).
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within a range of reasonableness. 21 9 Under this article's proposal, however,
the second inquiry (generally and in the special QVC setting) would not be
an inquiry at all into the quality of the actual decision, but only a very
limited inquiry into whether the decision actually made was "rationally
related to" (or, in the special QVC setting, a higher standard of "reasonably
related to") the sound decision-making process actually undertaken."
A third setting in which neither the business judgment nor the entire
fairness review standard applies to director conduct involves review of
director supervision and oversight of the corporation. As noted by
Chancellor Allen, most corporate actions are not the subject of director
attention, and thus such actions stem from "unconsidered inaction,"" rather
than deliberate business decisions implicating the business judgment rule.
In addressing the obligation of a board to supervise and monitor corporate
affairs, Chancellor Allen described a board's "obligation to be reasonably
informed concerning the corporation."tm He elaborated that the board's
obligation involved "assuring themselves that information and reporting
systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to
senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information...
to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance
with law and its business performance."' Although generally director
liability predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities requires a
"sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight,"
Chancellor Allen described an "utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists" 4 as such a failure. Chancellor
Allen characterized this responsibility as involving the "directors duty of
care.
"225
If directors make .a considered decision regarding the corporation's
"information and reporting systems," that decision, as with any business
decision, should be reviewed under the business judgment rule facet of due
care. If no such decision is made, however, the business judgment rule does
219QVCNetwork, Inc., 637 A.2d at 45.
'"See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
"'In re Caremark Int'l Inc., Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
tm ld. at 970 (emphasis added).
Id (emphasis added). ChiefJustice Veasey has also stated that "[i]fa court were to
require any system, it would probably be a reasonable system - one within a range of
reasonableness, considering the custom of the times, common sense, practicability and all the
circumstances." E. Norman Veasey, The Director and the Dynamic Corporation Law with Special
Emphasis on Oversight and Disclosure, 5 CoRP. GoVERNANcE ADvISOR, No. 4 (JuIJAug. 1997),
at 22, 26.
22In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
2-Iad Interestingly, Chancellor Allen also described this duty of care as "satisfied inpart
by assurance of adequate information flows to the board." Id (emphasis added).
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not apply and the conduct of directors must be assessed under the general
duty of due care. This duty would require a court to determine whether
directors failed to act with the care an ordinarily prudent person would
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position under similar
circumstances. This failure would seem to be established upon a showing
of noncompliance with Caremark's requirement of "reasonably designed"
information and reporting systems and that this noncompliance proximately
caused loss to the plaintiffi' In the general monitoring setting, then, as in
certain special settings, Delaware law already recognizes the baseline duty
of directors to act in a reasonable manner.
Finally, the Delaware corporation statute itself recognizes the concept
of director "reasonable care" in section 141(e). 7 That statute provides that
directors are "fully protected in relying in good faith upon[,]" among other
matters, "information, opinions, reports or statements" presented by any
person as to matters a director "reasonably believes are within such other
person's professional or expert competence and who... [was] selected with
reasonable care."2 8 This statute, addressing the important subject of director
reliance on experts, requires, as a predicate for such reliance, that the expert
must have been selected by the exercise of "reasonable care." This is yet
another instance of Delaware corporate law recognizing a director obligation
of "reasonableness," rather than either substantive fairness, on the one hand,
or mere avoidance of gross negligence, on the other hand.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article proposes that Delaware expressly generalize the director
duty to act with reasonable prudence. That duty is the duty of entire due
care. If Chancellor Allen is correct, and most corporate decisions are not the
subject of considered director action, 9 the Caremark "reasonableness"
standard probably already is the prevailing standard against which most
director behavior in the care area will be measured. If so, the applicability
of such a pervasive duty of reasonableness in the monitoring area should be
acknowledged. Moreover, that such a standard is not- and cannot sensibly
be - Cede's entire fairness standard ought also to be acknowledged.
Finally, that such a reasonableness standard should also apply in that special
category of care cases- where business judgment is exercised- must also
z'Id at 970 n.27. Notwithstanding Cede Hfs reversal of Chancellor Allen's lower court
ruling in that case that director duty breaches mustbe causally linked with plaintiffs damages, Alien
rightly adheres to the causation requirement in the cited Caremark dictum.
2"DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
=ld
229See supra text accompanying note 221.
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be recognized. Entire fairness review of the sort applied in Cede has no role
in judicial review of director care, whether in the business judgment or any
other setting. The result is that the "reasonableness" standard currently
applied both in the general monitoring area and in what Delaware courts
might consider to be special settings actually is, when shorn of judicial
review of substantive reasonableness, very close to the standard by which
director behavior should always be measured inthe care area. The Delaware
Supreme Court should state this.

